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Introduction 
In April 1994, the ministers of more than a hundred governments signed 
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations achieved after seven and a half years of negotiation. 
The Act comprises the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade 
Organization .with its important Annexes 1 to 4 in its Part II, Ministerial 
Decisions and Declarations in its Part III and the Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services in Part IV The WTO came irito effect 
on 1 January 1995 and ·has 134 Members presently. 1 
The process of negotiation and conclusion of the WTO agreements on the 
part of the European Community was marked by the question of which 
entity should negotiate and sign the agreements, the Community or its 
Member States or both. Out of practical reasons, it was the Community 
which took part in the Uruguay negotiations on behalf of its Members 
whereas both the Community and the Member States signed the 
agreements and thus became full Members of the WTO. 2 The Member 
States ratified the agreements by means of their national laws 3 
Since WTO law deals with the rules of trade between nations and the basic 
rules for international commerce and for trade policy, 4 the question of its 
relation to Community law which sets up its own rules for Community 
commerce is raised. 
On the one hand, the compatibility of the EU and other regional 
arrangements 5 with the WTO comes to question. Those agreements, 
which involve the abolition or reduction of barriers on trade within the 
group can benefit countries but can also harm the interests of other 
countries. They can particularly violate the WTO principle of "most-
favoured-nation". However, GATT Art.XXIV allows for regional trading 
1 As of 10 Febrnary 1999; see for the full text of the Agreements http://tradi11g.w1nw.com/gatt/; see 
for a list of all Members http://www.\\to.org/I1,to/about/organs116.htm. 
2 See below at Part 2. A. 
3 See for example the German law of ratification in Bundesgesetzblatt I 994 Part II p.1438, 
hltp://www.jurn. Lmi-sb.ddl3Gl31/11::IL2/ l 994/19941438.2.lllMl,# *): 
4 http://www. ,,to. org/wto/abouufactsO.htm 
5 Such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Conunon Market of the South 
(Mercosur), the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement, etc. 
1 
systems that complement the multilateral trading system instead of 
threatening it. 6 
Moreover, one has to ask as to what adaptations have to be arranged for 
the trade relations between the European Union with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific ACP) developing countries when the Lome IV 
Convention runs out in February 2000 to assure its compatibility with 
WTO rules. 
On the other hand, the inner-European perspective of WTO law and the 
question of the place of the WTO in the European Union are of high 
interest. What happens to European legislation that violates WTO rules? 
Can individual citizens invoke WTO rules in front of the European Court 
of Justice (problem of "direct effect" of WTO rules)? Can Member States 
do so or can they be forced to violate WTO rules by European organs? 
The following essay deals with this inner-European perspective of the 
relation between the European Union and the WTO only. 7 First of all, the 
place of the WTO Agreement within the EU and the European Court's 
concept of "direct effect" will be examined. 8 Part 2 attempts to find answer 
the question of which courts are entitled to determine the effect of WTO 
rules within European law. A brief description of the major changes of the 
Uruguay Round compared to the old GATT follows in Part 3. Finally, the 
problem of direct effect of WTO rules within the law of the European 
Union will be discussed thoroughly. 9 
6 GAIT Art.XXIV sets up strict criteria that determine when such exceptions to the most-favoured-
nation principle can be accepted: duties and other trade barriers should be reduced or removed on 
substantial(v all of sectors of trade. Moreover, non-members should not find trade with the group 
any more restrictive than before the group was established. 
7 See with regard to the other problem for example Rydelski, Michael Sanchez, The Future of the 
Lome Convention and its WTO Compatibility, in Europii.ische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1998, 
398ff. 
8 See below Part 1. 
9 See below Part 4. 
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Part 1: The WTO as an International Agreement in the 
EC and the Concept of Direct Effect 
A. Place of the WTO in the EC as an International Agreement 
According to Art.228 (7)1° of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (the Treaty), international agreements concluded by 
the Community are binding on the Community and its Member States and 
become an integral part of Community law_ll As a consequence, the 
European Court of Justice12 has to take their provisions into account when 
judging upon the validity of secondary Community law since international ,, 
agreements fall under the expression "law" in terms of Art.164 of the 
Treaty. 13 Art.228 (7) of the Treaty also tells us that international 
agreements are situated above the level of secondary Community law in 
the hierarchy of norms. That means that secondary Community law 
suspected to infringe an international agreement can generally be 
challenged by Community organs, by Member States or Individuals under 
Art.173 of the Treaty14 or through requests of national courts for 
preliminary rulings under Art.177. 15 However, the Court has constantly 
stated that if the international agreement does not produce "direct effect", 
neither individuals nor Member States can invoke its rules in front of the 
Court; the consequence is that the Court will not consider the international 
agreement when examining the Community's measure's legality. 16 
Thus, although the WTO Agreement is positioned above secondary 
Community law in the hierarchy, it cannot be invoked and thus cannot bar 
I 
contradictory Community legislation if it does not produce such direct 
effect. 17 The policy reason behind 'that restriction is apparently the wish to 
avoid conflicts in situations where the Community chooses to ignore or 
evade provisions of the agreement. In international law, there is no such 
10_Art.300 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
11 See Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium, (1974] ECR 449, paras 2 to 6. 
12 subsequently "the Court". 
13 Art. 220 Amsterdam Treaty. 
14 Art. 230 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
15 Art.234 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
16 See below at C. 
17 Schroeder, Die EG, das GAIT und die Vollzugslehre, Juristenzeitung 1998, 344, 345. · 
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thing as an executing authority18 and thus nations are sometimes tempted 
to breach their international agreements. If the Community allowed its 
Member States or Individuals to invoke any provision of any international 
agreement to dispute Community legislation but other Parties to the 
Agreement did not do so, the Community's hands would soon be tied and 
political leisure would scarcely be left. Such reasoning seems particularly 
convincing with regard to agreements that are not at all designed for the 
purpose of the protection of Individuals. 
B. The European Court of Justice and the Concept of "Direct 
Effect" 
In order to find out whether the new WTO Agreement produces such 
effect the European Court's concept of direct effect will be examined 
forthwith. 
I. The Court's Approach in Determining "Direct Effect" 
1. Development of the Doctrine of Direct Effect (Direct Effect of 
the Rome Treaty and Community Legislation) 
The European Court's direct effect doctrine was developed m cases 
concerning the invocation of Community law before national courts. This 
question was first considered in van Gend en Loos19 where a Dutch 
importer challenged an import duty before a Dutch court arguing that it 
increased the import duties in violation of Art.12 of the Treaty. 20 The 
Court deemed it "necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and 
the wording of those provisions" in order to determine whether national 
courts must protect rights emerging from the EC Treaty. 21 
In regarding the Treaty as a whole, indications for its intention to create 
rights for individuals as well as for Member States were found in the 
language of the preamble, the incorporation of Community institutions 
18 Apart from other means such as retaliation or retorsion. 
19 Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrasie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
20 Art.25 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
21 1963 ECR at 12. . 
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endowed with sovereign rights and the objective of assuring uniform 
interpretation of Community law found in Art.177 of the Treaty. 22 
In looking at the specific wording of Art.12 of the Treaty the Court held 
that it "must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating 
individual rights which national courts must protect" since the language of 
Art.12 was clear and unconditional, required no implementing legislation 
by the Member States, and offered no leeway of discretion in its 
application. 23 
Subsequently, the notion of direct effect has been amplified to other 
Articles of ·the Treaty,24 to several disputes between private parties 
("horizontal" direct effect/5 as well as to regulations, directives and 
decisions promulgated under Art.189.26 The direct effect notion is further 
reinforced by the Community concept of primacy, which provides for 
supremacy of Community law over national law of a Member State.27 
Efficiency of EC law is thus increased since national courts can apply 
directly effective EC law and enforce their orders, for example, by the 
award of damages. 
2. The Court's Approach in Determining the Effect of 
International Agreements 
After the Court had decided on direct applicability of EC Law, it was soon 
confronted with a similar question on a parallel level, i.e. the question of 
direct effect of international agreements in EC law. Similarly to its 
approach in examining direct effect of EC-law, it repeatedly found that the 
determination of direct applicability depends on the spirit, general schemes 
and wording of the agreement and of the provision concerned. 28 That 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., at 13. 
24 For example L1Utcke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, [1966] ECR 205, [1971] 10 CMLR 674 
(concerning Art. 95), Case 6/64 Costa v. E.NE.L., [1964] ECR 585, [1964] 3 CMLR 425 
(concerning Art. 37 and 53). 
25 for example Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 
P 976) ECR 631, [1976] 2 CMLR 98. 
0 Art.249 of the Amsterdam Treaty; see Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect o/GATT 1994 in 
European Community Law, 30 Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 69. 
27 See, e.g., case 6/64 Costa v. E.NE.L.. [1964) ECR 585, [1964) 3 CMLR 425. 
28 Joined cases 21 - 24/72 Intemational Fntit Company v. Produktschap voor Groente11 en Fmit, 
[1972) ECR 1219, at 1227; case 87/75 Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1976] 
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means that, in order to be directly effective, a provision must contain a 
sufficiently precise and unconditional obligation, the accomplishment and 
effects of which do not depend on a further act of implementation. 29 
A closer look to the Court's former decisions on direct effect · of 
international agreements will be taken forthwith. 
II. Cases Concerned with Direct Effect of International Agreements 
In Bresciani v. Amministrazione Jtaliana delle Finanze, 30 the Court 
examined direct effect of Art.2 (1) of the Yaounde Convention (1963).31 In 
looking at the "spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the 
Convention and of the provision concerned", 32 it was held that the 
Convention's conclusion within the framework of Art.228 of the EC 
Treaty gave strength to its effect. Since it intended to promote the 
development of the Associated States and since the imbalance of the 
obligations undertaken by the parties was inherent to the Convention's 
special nature the lack of reciprocity between the parties' oblig~tions did 
not prevent direct effect.33 Because the elimination of charges with a 
similar effect "must, on the part of the Community, proceed 
automatically", the inclusion of a dispute settlement framework did not 
prevent direct effect either. 34 Moreover, the Yaounde Convention 
specifically mentioned the corresponding Art.13 of the EC Treaty, which 
lead the Court to the finding that "the Community undertook precisely the 
same obligation towards the Associated States to abolish charges having 
equivalent effect as, in the Treaty, the Member States assumed towards 
each other. "35 
In Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops, 36 Article 14 (2) of the free trade 
agreement between the Community and Portugal was found not to be 
ECR, 129, at 139; case 270/80 Polydor ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shop ltd., [1982] ECR, 329, at 
347. 
29 Case 12/86 Demi rel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmiind, [1986] ECR 3719, at 3752. 
3° Case 87n5 Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana de/le Finanze, [1976] ECR 129. 
31 concluded to abolish customs duties on goods originating in the Associated States (Madagascar 
and certain associated African States). 
32 Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana de/le Finanze, supra at 139. 
33 Ibid, at 140. 
34 Ibid., at 141. 
35 Ibid., at 141-42. 
36 Case 270/80 Po(vdor v. Harlequin Record Shops, [1982] ECR 329. 
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directly effective although its wording was just the same as that of Articles 
3037 and 3638 of the EC Treaty the two of which had been found to have 
direct effect in a prior decision. 39 The Court stated that the purpose of the 
free trade agreement was "expressed in terms (. .. ) similar to those of the 
EEC Treaty," i.e. "to eliminate progressively the obstacles to substantially 
all their trade, (. .. ) to liberalize trade in goods between the Community and 
Portugal" and to eradicate "customs -duties and (. .. ) charges having 
equivalent effect in trade. "40 However, it was determined that identity in 
language alone was not sufficient to grant the same effect to provisions of 
free trade agreements that was granted to Community law provisions if the 
agreements' purposes were similar but distinguishable. 41 In fact, the 
purpose of the free trade agreement was found to be separable from that in 
the EC Treaty, because "a prohibition on the importation into the 
Community of a product originating in Portugal based on the protection of 
copyright is justified in the framework of the free-trade arrangements 
established by the Agreements by virtue of the first sentence of Article 23" 
even "in a situation in which their justification would not be possible 
within the Community."42 
In Pabst and Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 43 a plaintiff succeeded 
in relying on Article 53 of the Association Agreement with Greece in 
bringing an action against the German customs authority. The Court held 
that Article 53 fulfilled the same function as Article 95 of the EC Treaty44 
and that the purpose of the agreement was to prepare Greece to eventually 
become a member of the Community. Since Article 53 also contained a 
sufficiently clear and precise obligation, it was held to be directly 
applicable. 
Apparently, the Court seems to be more willing to grant direct effect to 
provisions of association agreements than to trade agreements. 
37 Article 28 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
38 Article 30 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
39 Case 78nO Deutsche Grammophon mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmaerkte GmbH, [1971] ECR 487. 
40 Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops, supra at 347. 
41 Ibid., at 348. 
42 Ibid., at 394. 
43 Pabst and Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, [1982] ECR 1331. 
44 Article 90 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
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Ill. The Court's Decisions on Direct Effect of GATT 1947 
1. Denial of Direct Effect of GATT 1947 
The question of the invocation of GAIT law in European Courts first 
arose in International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit, 45 where an importer of apples from a non-Member State challenged 
the denial of import certificates and its underlying Council regulations. In 
doing so, he relied on GAIT Art.XI which provides that "no prohibitions 
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges ... shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product 
of the territory of any other contracting party."46 In order to succeed, the 
plaintiff had to show that Art.XI GAIT constituted rights capable of being 
asserted by Individuals before courts within the European Union. 
In its judgement, the Court first stated that the General Agreement was 
binding upon the European Community. Although the Community had not 
existed when GAIT was created in 1948, Art. 110,47 111, 113 and 23448 of 
the Treaty indicated the Member States" clear intention that the 
Community be bound by the GAIT obligations.49 Furthermore, it was 
noted that other GATT Contracting Parties recognized the European 
Community Role in representing the Member States in GAIT affairs. 50 
The Court then applied the criteria established in the direct effect test of 
Van Gend en Loos to ascertain whether this binding agreement was also 
capable of conferring rights on the Community's citizens which they could 
invoke before European courts. However, in contrast to Van Gend en Loos, 
the Court did not consider Art.XI GATT by itself but paid regard to "the· 
spirit, the general scheme and the terms of the General Agreement" as a _. 
whole. 51 It noted that the GAIT preamble was "based on the principle of 
negotiations undertaken on the · basis of 'reciprocal and mutually 
45 Joined Cases 21 - 24/72 International Frnit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Frnit, 
Q 972] ECR 1219. 
Art. XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, TIAS No. 
1700, 55 UNTS 187 (hereinafter GAIT). 
47 Article 110 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
48 Articles 133 and 307 of the Amsterdam Treaty. · 
49 
Joined Cases 21 - 24/72 Intemational Frnit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Frnit, 
{1972] ECR 1219, at 1227. ' 
0 Ibid. 
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advantageous arrangements"' and that the GATT was "characterized by 
the great flexibility of its provisions". 52 The Court based its statement on 
three provisions of the GAIT: the safeguard measures (Art.XIX), the 
consultation procedure (Art.XXII) and the dispute resolution procedure 
(Art.XXIII). 53 Having found that GAIT itself was too flexible, the Court 
assumed that Art.XI itself did not create rights capable of enforcement by 
individuals before European Courts without ever directly examining 
GATT Art. Xl. 54 
The Court merely rephrased the relevant passage of the International Fruit 
decision in Schliiter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach55 where Community 
regulations were challenged that allegedly had the consequence of raising 
import-duties of Swiss cheese above the binding GATT level. 56 
Consequently, direct effect of GAIT Art.II was denied without paying 
attention to this particular provision. 
In Douaneagent der Nederlandse Spoorwegen NV v. Inspecteur der 
Jnvoerrechten en Accijnzen, 57 the Court was faced with a Community 
interpretative note to a regulation that had the effect of increasing the tariff 
on certain machines in the Netherlands' customs law and allegedly violated 
the tariff concessions agreed to by the Community under GATT Art.II. 
The issue of direct effect, however, was avoided in the decision since the 
Court found the provision in question consistent with GATT.58 
In Firma Anton Diirbeck v. Hauptzollamt Franlifurt am Main-Flughafen, 59 
a case concerned with Community quantitative restrictions on apples from 
Chile, the Court also avoided addressing the direct effect issue when it was 
required to reflect on the effect of GAIT Art. XIII by declaring that no 
substantial violation had been found. 60 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., at para 21. 
53 Ibid., at 1228. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Case 9/73, (1973] ECR 1135. 
56 Case 9/73 Schl11ter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, (1973] ECR 1135, at 1157-58. 
57 Case 38/75 Douaneagent der Nederlandse Spoorwegen NV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 
Acclj'11ze11, (1975] ECR 1439. 
58 Case 38/75 Douaneagent der Nederlandse Spoorwegen NV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 
Accij11ze11, (1975] ECR 1439, at 1450. 
59 Case 112/80 Firma Anton D11rbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen, (1981] ECR 
1095. 
60 Ibid., at 1120. 
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In later cases, the Court also dealt with national ( as opposed to 
Community) law measures that were challenged as being inconsistent with 
GATT. 61 
In Amministrazione de/le Finanze de/lo Stato v. Societa Petro!ifera 
Jtaliana SpA, the Court was asked to investigate whether an Italian duty 
for administrative services was incompatible with GATT Art.II (1) (b) 
bound concessions. The Court first deemed it "important that the 
provisions of GATT should, like the provisions of all other agreements 
binding the Community, receive uniform application throughout the 
Community." Consequently, it held that the provisions of GATT were 
exclusively to be interpreted by the European Court of Justice and not by 
national courts.62 In both SIOT and SP!, the Court again relied on 
International Fruit to deny direct effect to several GATT provisions in 
arguing that, due to its "general scheme", the entire GATT was unable to 
grant rules on which individuals could rely. 63 The Court never mentioned 
the alterations inaugurated by the Tokyo Round, e.g. the Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement. 
In Germany v. Counci/, 64 the Court had to deal with Germany's allegation 
that the Council's Regulation 404/93, 65 which established a common 
banana market in the Community, infringed certain GATT provisions and 
was therefore illegal. 
Germany argued that compliance with GATT rules was a condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts and that, accordingly, the question of direct 
effect was of no interest in this case. 66 
Without taking into account the difference that in this case, as opposed to 
the International Fruit case, the complainant was a Member State 
challenging the regulation by means of Art.173 of the EC Treaty and not 
61 Joined cases 267 to 269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa Petrolifera 
ltaliana SpA (SP!), (1983] ECR 801; case 266/81 Societa ltaliana per L 'Oreodotto Transalpino 
(SIOT) v. ivlinistero delle Finanze, (1983] ECR 73 I; Joined cases 290 to 291/81 Compagnia Singer 
SfA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, (1983] ECR 847. 
0 supra at 828. 
63 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa Petrolifera ltaliana SpA {SP/}, supra at 828; 
Societa ltaliana per L 'Oreodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v. Ministero delle Finanze, supra at 779f. 
64 Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council, (1994] ECR I-4973. 
05 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1. 
66 Ibid., at I-5071. 
an individual, the Court merely repeated that GATT provisions are 
incapable of having direct effect because it was "based on the principle of 
negotiations undertaken on the basis of 'reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements,"' and "the possibility of derogation," "the 
measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties" and 
"its provisions dealing with the settlement of conflicts" were too flexible. 67 
The Court did not consider the changes introduced by the Tokyo Round or 
the subsequent changes to the dispute resolution procedure. It further noted 
that the exceptions for granting "indirect" effect of GATT provisions 
found in Fediof8 and Nakijama,69 were not applicable here since the 
Regulation in question neither intended to implement a particular 
provision of GAIT nor expressly referred to them.70 
Apart from the fact that, for the first time,. a case concerned with direct 
effect was initiated by a Member State under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 
a second significant development of the Court's direct effects doctrine can 
be observed: 71 
By the time the Court decided the case, several GAIT panel reports had 
already been presented stating the clear infringement of the Community's 
policy on banana imports; the restrictions were found to be inconsistent 
with the prohibition of quantitative restrictions in GATT Art.I and the 
most-favoured nation requirements of GAIT Art.XI_72 Furthermore, a 
panel was set up by the GAIT Council to investigate protests by five Latin 
American nations against the new Regulation 404/93-banana regime. 73 
The subsequent report ruled that the regulation was inconsistent with the 
Community's Article II schedules of concessions and infringements of 
GAIT Articles I (most-favoured-nation requirement) and III (national 
treatment). 74 
67 Ibid., at I-5072-73. 
68 Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission, (1989] ECR 1781. 
69 Case C-69/89 Nakijama All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council, (1991] ECR I-2069. 
70 Ibid., at I-5073-74. 
71 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1996-97), 556, 596. 
72 Russia applies for GAIT membership: Panel rules against EC members' restrictions of bananas, 
100 GA TT Focus, July 1993, at 2. 
73 Ibid., at 4. 
74 Panel report on EC banana import regime presented, 108 GAIT Focus, June 1994, at 5. 
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2. "Indirect Effect" of GATT 1947 in Fediol / Nakijama 
In Fediol IJJ75 and Nakijama76 , the Court did take into account certain 
provisions of the GAIT. These decisions, however, cannot be regarded as 
a change in the Court's position since the cases were different in their 
facts. In both of these cases, Community legislation existed as a starting 
point for exceptional applicability of GAIT law within Community law. 
In Fediol 111, a provision of Council Regulation 2641/8477 expressly 
referred to the term "illicit commercial practice", a legal term of GAIT, 
and determined that it was to be interpreted as trade practices contrary to 
international law, including the GAIT. The Court found that it was not 
prevented to interpret and apply more precisely defined GAIT rules, 
neither by the general flexibility of GAIT nor by its dispute resolution 
provisions. 78 
The Nakijama decision dealt with a Community measure that intended to 
implement a particular GAIT obligation. Therefore, the Court had to 
interpret parts of the Antidumping Code to "examine whether the Council 
went beyond the legal framework thus laid down, as Nakijama claims, and 
whether, by adopting the disputed provision, it acted in breach of Art. 2 ( 4) 
and (6) of the Anti-Dumping Code."79 The regulation, however, was found 
to be valid since the regulation was in harmony with the Anti-Dumping 
Code provisions. 
IV. Attempts to Categorize the Cases 
In view of the above mentioned decisions one could assume that the 
question of whether an agreement is directly effective or not depends on 
the degree of its tie to the EC Treaty: In Bresciani, the Court granted direct 
effect to the Yaounde Convention that made arrangements specifically 
provided for in the EC Treaty and intended to favour former colonies and 
related countries. An association agreement arranging the affiliation of a 
75 Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission, [ 1989] ECR 1781. 
76 Case C-69/89 Nakijama All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council, (1991] ECR I-2069. 
77 Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the strengthening of the common 
commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices (1984] 
OJ L252/l. 
78 Fediol /11, supra, at 1831. 
79 Nakijama All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council, supra at I-2178. 
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non-member country as a member of the Community was the source of a 
directly effective rule in Pabst & Richarz. Conversely, free trade 
agreements that lacked sufficient connection to the constitutional 
framework of the EC Treaty were not capable of producing direct effect, as 
seen in Polydor and International Fruit. 80 Thus, it could be said that direct 
effect could be granted to provisions of association agreements, but not to 
free trade agreements. 81 
Moreover, it might appear decisive to the Court that an international 
agreement contains an institutional framework for dispute settlement82 to 
be granted direct effect. 83 It could also be deemed important that an 
international agreement might have direct effect only if the other party of 
the agreement recognizes such an effect, since a party not accepting direct 
effect of several provisions places itself in a favourable position compared 
to a country that is bound by an interpretation of the treaty through its own 
national courts 84 
However, the Court did not follow that line in its next decision concerned 
with direct effect of an international agreement: In Hauptzollamt Mainz v. 
Kupferberg, 85 an importer of Portuguese wine asked the Court to declare a 
German monopoly equalisation duty ,unlawful alleging that it violated 
Art.95 of the EC Treaty and Art.21 (1) of the free trade agreement between 
the Community and Portugal. The Court ruled that Art.21 (1) of the 
Agreement was directly effective. It held that agreements concluded under 
Art.228 of the EC Treaty are binding upon both the Community and the 
Member States. The Court deemed it "incumbent upon the Community 
institutions, as well as upon the Member States, to ensure compliance with 
the obligations arising from such agreements."86 Member State obligations 
emanating from agreements concluded by the Community institutions 
80 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 556, 587f. ( 1996-97). 
81 Ibid., at 590. 
82 See e.g. the above mentioned cases International Fruit, Schluter and Diirbeck. 
83 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 556, 588. (1996-97). 
84 Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 In European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 85. 
85 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG, [1982] ECR 3641. 
86 Hauptzol/amtMainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG, [1982] ECR 3641, at 3662. 
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created rights and obligations to the Community itself "which has assumed 
responsibility for the due performance of the agreement."87 Accordingly, 
the Court described the agreement as a directly effective, essential part of 
Community law by means of Art.228 of the EC Treaty. The Court also 
stated that the principal of reciprocity was not necessarily a deciding 
argument to reject direct effect. 88 Likewise, neither the presence of an 
institutional framework for dispute settlement89 nor the presence of a 
safeguard clause90 in the agreement alone were held to be determinative 
factors in considering direct effect. 
In Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 91 provisions of the Association 
Agreement with Turkey were found not to be directly applicable. In 
contrast to its decision in International Fruit, the Court considered specific 
provisions of the Agreement although it held the Agreement in general as 
being incapable of granting direct effects. The provisions in question, 
however, were "not sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of 
governing directly the movement of workers. "92 
Other directly effective provisions were found in bilateral trade agreements 
in Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie 93 - where direct effect was 
granted tci a decision of the Council of Association instituted by the 
Association Agreement with Turkey - and in ONEM v. Bahia Kziber, 
where national treatment provisions of the Co-operation Agreement 
between the EC and Morocco were held to be directly applicable. 94 
It can be concluded that the type of the agreement is not the deciding 
factor for granting direct effect to provisions of international agreements. 
On the other hand, the Court's differentiation between GAIT cases that 
are examined in a "context-approach" whereas other cases are scrutinized 
in a "textual approach" 95 seems to make sense_% In the GAIT cases, the 
87 Ibid., at 3662. 
88 Ibid.. at 3663-64. 
89 Ibid., at 3664. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Case 12/86, [ 1986] ECR 3719, at 3752. 
92 Ibid, at 3753. 
93 Case C-192/89, [I 990] ECR I-3461. 
94 Case C-18/90, (1991] ECRI-199. 
95 This tem1inology has been taken over from Pierre Pescatore, Treaty-Making by the European 
Communities, in The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, I 77, 184 -88 (Francis G. Jacobs & 
Shelley Roberts eds., I 987; the textual approach has been applied by the Court in Bresciani and 
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Court never examines the specific provision alleged to have direct effect 
because it finds the whole agreement as being "a forum for commercial 
negotiations rather than a set of binding rules."97 In contrast, specific 
provisions are examined in other, non-GATT cases. This differentiation 
has been feared to lead to contradictory results because certain stipulations 
can produce direct effect in some agreements whereas identical provisions 
cannot produce direct effect in the GATT agreement. 98 However, it has 
already been said in Polydor99 that identity in language is not sufficient to 
grant the same effect to provisions because their purpose might differ. 
The answer to the question of direct effect of WTO provisions can 
therefore not be derived from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a free 
trade agreement. Rather, the "spirit, the general scheme and the wording" 
of the WTO Agreement has to be examined to find proof for or against its 
suitability for direct effect. 
C. The WTO System in Comparison with the Community's 
other International Agreements and with EC Law 
Whereas in its Van Gend & Loss decision, the Court put emphasis on the 
operational character of individual rules, i.e. whether they are sufficiently 
clear and unconditional to be applied in a specific dispute, that stage was 
never reached in GATT. Here, the agreement as such was rejected the 
capacity to create individual rights enforceable before a court of law. Thus, 
the Community legal order has to be distinguished from the international 
legal order. In fact, the Community legal order is "more or less full-
grown" and has a much more domestic character than an international 
one. 100 While in the European Community, Member States have 
surrendered parts of their sovereignty to the benefit of the Community this 
cannot be said for the GATT or WTO Agreement. Although Members of 
Kupferberg whereas in the cases concerned with GAIT, the Court never investigated the single 
£revision in question. 
6 Pescatore, ibid.. at 187, and Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United 
States and the European Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business ( 1996-
97), 556, 592, find that analytical distinction problematic. 
97 Pescatore, ibid.. at 186-187. 
98 Ibid.. at I 87. 
99 See above C. Il. 
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the WTO system have signed the Agreements and are subject to a 
sophisticated dispute settlement system, they are not bound in a way as 
strong as the Community's Member States are. For instance, in opposite to 
the Community law system, there is no institution in the WTO that can 
release entirely new legislation becoming valid in the national law systems 
of the Members without any act of implementation. Moreover, nationals of 
the WTO' s Members are not asked to vote for the composition of any of 
the WTO's organs. There are no areas in the WTO's Members' legal 
systems that are reserved for the WTO' s dispute settlement organs' 
"jurisdiction" only and which prevent national courts from ruling on those 
subjects (i.e. preliminary rulings). Furthermore, individuals are not entitled 
to bring complaints in front of a WTO panel, whereas they can do so under 
Community law. Last but not least, the WTO may contain isolated 
individual rights as for example in the TRIPS Agreement; it does not, 
however, have basic individual freedoms as a main feature, which the EC 
Treaty, in contrast, does have. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that provisions of other international 
agreements have been granted direct effect, which did not have any of 
those features either. 
However, the "spirit and general scheme" of GAIT did not suggest its 
capacity to include directly applicable provisions. Possibly, a clear 
distinction between the "spirit" of the GATT/WTO and that of the other 
international agreements that have been granted direct effect by the Court 
is to be found in the number of its Members. While the WTO has more 
than 100 Members, the agreements held by the Court to be capable of 
direct effect have been concluded by the Community on a bilateral basis or 
with less developed countries where the Community could be regarded as 
the most powerful party. Under WTO, this power is offset particularly by 
that of the United States and Japan. 101 As discussed earlier, the Court was 
more willing to grant direct effect to those agreements that were designed 
100 Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, 11 p. 56. . 
10 'Lee/K.enne<ly, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 82f. 
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to establish closer link between the parties, sometimes with a view to 
subsequent accession to the EC. 
It remains to be seen whether the "spirit and general scheme" of WTO still 
suggests its general non-ability to provide directly effective rules. 
Part 2: The Problem of Jurisdiction 
After the conclusion of the WTO Agreement another problem came to 
stage which had never arisen in connection with GA TT 194 7 because there 
the competence had completely been taken over by the Community as an 
exclusive competence. The problem is the question of which entity will be 
entitled to rule upon the question of direct effect of WTO provisions; is it 
the European Court of Justice or national courts of the Community's 
Member States or both depending on what WTO provision is invoked? 
A. The Court's Opinion 1194: Competence to Conclude the 
WTO Agreement 
The point of departure must be the Court's Opinion 1/94102 where it was 
asked to decide whether exclusive competence to conclude the WTO 
Agreement and its annexed Agreements lay with the Community pursuant 
to Article 113 of the Treaty. 
The Community's right to conclude trade agreements is based on Article 
113 of the EC Treaty. The question of what sort of stipulations the 
Community 1s entitled to conclude within these tariff and trade 
agreements, however, has long been a matter of dispute. Whereas the 
Community's competence is undoubted with respect to provisions 
concerning the commerce of goods, its competence regarding the exchange 
of services and the border crossing by citizens has been questioned. 
Shortly before the WTO Agreement was about to be ratified, the 
Commission brought proceedings before the Court under Article 228 ( 6) of 
the EC Treaty to give an Opinion as to whether the Community had 
exclusive competence to conclude the WTO Agreement and its annexed 
Agreements in terms of Article 113 of the Treaty. 
102 Opinion 1/94 of 15/11/1994, [1994)ECR I-5267. 
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Whereas the Commission was of the opinion that the Community enjoyed 
sole competence to conclude the entire agreement, the Member States 
denied the Community's unshared competence particularly with regard to 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 1 B, GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Annex 1 C, TRIPS). Although some scholars demanded the general 
inclusion of services in the scope of Article 113 of the EC Treaty, 103 the 
European Court preferred a differentiating approach. 104 
With regard to the GAIT, the Court held that agreements concluded under 
Article 113 of the EC Treaty applied to trade in EURATOM, ECSC and 
agricultural products. 105 As regards GATS, the Court decided that cross-
frontier supplies of services not involving any movement of persons were 
covered by Article 113 of the Treaty, whereas consumption abroad, 
commercial presence and the supplier's delegation of a person to the 
consumer's country did not fall under Article 113 because these modes 
involved the movement of persons or corporations. Given that separate 
provisions of the EC Treaty also covered transport it was not subject to the 
Community's exclusive competence under Article 113 either. 106 The Court 
then regarded the TRIPS and found that only one provision of the TRIPS 
was closely related to trade in goods and thus fell under the Community's 
exclusive competence, namely Article 51, which prohibits the release into 
free circulation of counterfeit goods. Intellectual property rights did not 
specifically relate to international trade even though they could affect 
international trade. 107 
The Court also rejected the Commission's second set of arguments based 
on the doctrine of parallelism. 108 It ruled that, in the case of GATS and 
TRIPS, the Community and the Member States were jointly competent; 
103 Bogdandy/ Nettesheim, Europaische Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht 1993, 465,466. 
104 It is worth reading the thorough summary of Opinion 1/94 by Hartley, The Foundations of 
European Community Law (4th Edition), pp. 165ff. 
105 See Hartley, ibid., at p. 166. 
106 Ibid., p. l 66f. 
107 See paras. 58 - 60 of Opinion 1/94. 
108 See more precisely Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, fourth edition, 
p.167f. 
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with respect to GAIT 94, on the other hand, the Community had exclusive 
competence. 
Thus, the WTO Agreement as a mixed agreement was signed by both the 
Member States of the European Community and the Community itself 
However, it is up to the Member States to ratify it. 109 
B. Competence to Interpret WTO Provisions and Their Effect 
With regard to the question of jurisdiction, it might immediately be 
concluded that, in so far as there is national competence, the courts of the 
Member States have jurisdiction to rule on the question of direct effect 
whereas it is up to the European Court of Justice to answer this questions 
in regard to the rest of the WTO Agreement. The result would be that there 
were not one domestic legal status, but sixteen. 110 
I. Court's Earlier Decisions 
Faced with the 1961 association agreement with Greece, another mixed 
agreement, the Court found that it was an act of an institution of the 
Community concluded by the Council under Articles 228 and 23 8111 of the 
EEC Treaty. It was held that since the agreement's provisions formed an 
integral part of Community law, the European Court had jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings regarding their interpretation. The Court made no 
distinction between prov1s1ons falling within the Community's 
competence and those coming within national competence. 112 
Furthermore, in Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, the Court stated with 
regard to the 1972 free trade agreement with Portugal (which was not a 
· mixed agreement) that "[i]t follows from the Community nature of such 
provisions that their effect in the Community may not be allowed to vary 
according to whether their application is in practice the responsibility of 
the Community institutions or of the Member States and, in the latter case, 
according to the effects in the internal legal order of each Member State 
109 See above Fn. 3. 
110 E.g. Macleod, Heny and Hyett, The Extemal Relations of the European Community (Oxford 
1996), p. 157. 
111 Art.310 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
112 Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium, (1974] ECR 449, paras. 2 to 6. 
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which the law of that State assigns to international agreements concluded 
by it. Therefore it is for the Court, within the framework of its jurisdiction 
in interpreting the provisions of agreements, to ensure their uniform 
application throughout the Community." 113 
In Sevince, the Court held that "[s]ince the Court has jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings on the Agreement, in so far as it is an act adopted by 
one of the institutions of the Community (. .. ), it also has jurisdiction to 
give rulings on the interpretation of the decisions adopted by the authority 
established by the Agreement and entrusted with responsibility for its 
implementation". 114 The same passage was mentioned in Kupferberg with 
regards to the requirement of uniform interpretation. 115 When the German 
Government asked the Court to overthrow its decision in Sevince and 
argued that matters within the competence of the Member States were not 
acts of the Community, the Court did not even respond to the German 
argumentation on the problem of competence. 116 
II. WTO as an Agreement Adopted by Community Institutions 
Since the Court has stated that it has jurisdiction insofar as the agreement 
is an act adopted by one of the institutions of the Community, the question 
remains as to what extent the WTO Agreement is such an act. 117 
Eeckhout118 points out three possible answers: 
The first possibility envisages that the Council only concluded the 
agreement in so · far as it falls under the Community's exclusive 
competence. Such reasoning could be concluded from the Preamble of the 
Council's decision where it is said that Article 73 C EC Treaty should not 
serve as a legal basis for the conclusion of the WTO because no acts have 
been adopted on its basis. 119 The Council apparently hints at Opinion 1/94, 
113 Case 104/81, [1982] ECR 3641, para 14. 
114 Case C-192/89, (1990] ECR I-3461, para 10. 
115 Case 104/81, [1982] ECR 3641, para 14. 
116 Case C-237/91, (1993] ECR I-6781, para 9. 
117 This question is dealt with in Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: 
Interco1111ecti11g Legal Systems, 34 CMLR 1997, 11. 
118 Ibid at l 7ff 
119 Cou'ncil De~ision of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusi~n on behalf of the European 
Conununity, as regards matters within competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994 ), O.J. 1994, L 336/1. 
20 
where it was said that exclusive competence only exists where there is 
internal Community legislation. 120 
As a second approach, it is arguable that the Community's jurisdiction 
with regard to WTO-questions in European law extends to both exclusive 
and non-exclusive Community competence. In fact, the heading of the 
Council's decision reads: "as regards matters within [the Community's] 
competence." There was no explicit limitation to merely exclusive 
Community competence. 
Thirdly, the entire WTO Agreement is attached to the Council's decision 
to conclude it that did not specifically point out which parts it aimed to 
conclude. Thus, it could be said that the whole WTO Agreement is an act of 
one of the Community institutions (the Council with the approval of the 
European Parliament). 
Ill. Jurisdiction under WTO: The Hermes Case 
The Court had to rule upon the question of its jurisdiction for the 
interpretation of a WTO-Provision that was concluded under the Member 
States' competence in Hermes International (a partnership limited by 
shares) v. FHT Marketing Choice BV. 121 
In that case, the Arrondissementrechtbank (District Court) Amsterdam 
directed to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of Article 50 
(6) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (hereinafter "TRIPS") for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of 
the EC Treaty. Part Ill of the TRIPS contains provisions aiming at the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. WTO-Parties have to ensure 
the inclusion in their legal systems of the procedures provided for in this 
part of TRIPS in order to enable effective proceedings towards 
infringements of those rights. 
The question of interpretation of Article 50 ( 6) TRIPS arose in legal 
proceedings between Hermes and FHT Marketing Choice BV (FHT), a 
company incorporated under Netherlands law, concerning trademark rights 
owned by Hermes. Neckties carrying the brand "Hermes" were distributed 
120 Opinion 1/94, supra at paras 95 and 102. 
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by FHT which lead Hermes to the application to the President of the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank for an interim order requiring FHT to cease 
infringement of its copyright and trade mark. Hermes also requested the 
adoption of all steps necessary to bring the infringement definitely to an 
end. Furthermore, Hermes asked the President to set a period of three 
months from the date of service of the interim decision as the period 
within which FHT could, under TRIPS Article 50 (6), request revocation 
of those provisional measures and a period of 14 days as the period within 
which Hermes could launch proceedings on the merits of the case, that 
period to run from the date on which FHT requested revocation. The 
President of the Arrondissementsrechtbank rejected his ability to grant the 
last request, since Article 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement does not place 
any time limit on the defendant's right to request revocation of provisional 
measures. He held that the intention of Article 50 (6) was, on the contrary, 
to allow the defendant to request revocation of a provisional measure at 
any time prior to delivery of judgement in the main proceedings. The 
period conceived in that provision for initiation of proceedings on the 
merits could not therefore be set by reference to a period within which the 
defendant must request revocation of the provisional measures. 
Nevertheless, the court speculated whether it was necessary to fix a date 
for the proceedings on the merits. This was considered to be the case if the 
measure ordered in the interim proceedings ( a measure pursuant to Article 
289 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure) was "a provisional 
measure" in terms of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly, the 
Dutch court referred the question to the European Court for a preliminary 
ruling whether an interim measure as, for example, provided for in Articles 
289ff. of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, fell within the scope of 
Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The Court held that it had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, arguing that 
121 Unpublished case C-53/96, available on the "europa" homepage ofhttp://europa.eu.int/ 
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"the WTO Agreement was concluded by the Community and ratified by its 
Member States without any allocation between them of their respective 
obligations towards the other contracting parties. Equally, without there being 
any need to determine the extent of the obligations assumed by the Community 
in concluding the agreement, it should be noted that when the Final Act and the 
WTO Agreement were signed by the Community and its Member States on 15 
April 1994, Regulation No 40/94 had been in force for one month. Article 50 
(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires that judicial authorities of the contracting 
parties be authorized to order 'provisional measures' to protect the interests of 
proprietors of trade-mark rights conferred under the laws of those parties. To 
that end, Article 50 lays down various procedural rules applicable to 
applications for the adoption of such measures. Under Article 99 of Regulation 
No 40/94, rights arising from a Community trade mark may be safeguarded by 
the adoption of 'provisional, including protective, measures'. It is true that the 
measures envisaged by Article 99 and the relevant procedural rules are those 
provided for by the domestic law of the Member State concerned for the 
purposes of the national trade mark. However, since the Community is a party 
to the TRIPS Agreement and since that agreement applies to the Community 
trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when 
called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures 
for the protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required 
to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 
of the TRIPS Agreement ( ... ). It follows that the Court has, in any event, 
jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement."122 
The Court first states that its jurisdiction to interpret WTO provisions is 
not connected to its competence to conclude the agreement, without 
however explaining why. In its former decisions, the Court merely 
assumed its jurisdiction "in so far as it is an act adopted by one of the 
institutions of the Community". The question in Hermes was concerned 
with the problem of the inner-European perspective of jurisdiction 
concerning a TRIPS provision, not with the international law perspective, 
from which the allocation of the Community's respective obligation is 
certainly insignificant because the Community signed the WTO 
Agreement without any reservation. The Court then argues that national 
122 Paras 24-29 of the judgement. 
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courts have to interpret Article 99 of Regulation 40/94 in the light of 
Article 50 TRIPS because the Community is a party to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Apparently, the Court suggests that the prov1s10ns on 
trademarks in the TRIPS Agreement would cause confusion if their 
domestic legal status were determined by sixteen different approaches. 
Since they influence both national law on trade marks and Community 
trade marks, 123 the consequence of one and the same provision could be 
divergent, depending on whether national or Community law is tested 
against it. The provision could for example have direct effect in one 
jurisdiction but not in another. Such an interconnection between the law in 
Europe and WTO law appears to be undesirable to the Court. This and 
probably the fact that it was the Community that took part in the Uruguay 
negotiations must be the reasoning underlying the Court's conclusion to 
claim its jurisdiction "in any event" to interpret Article 50 TRIPS. 
The Court then continues to argue that 
"[i]t is immaterial that the dispute in the main proceedings concerns trade marks 
whose international registrations designate the Benelux. First, it is solely for the 
national court hearing the dispute, which must assume responsibility for the 
order to be made, to assess the need for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to 
·give its judgment. Consequently, where the question referred to it concerns a 
provision which it has jurisdiction to interpret, the Court of Justice is, in 
principle, bound to give a ruling ( ... ). Second, where a provision can apply both 
to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling 
within the scope of Community law, it is clearly in the Community interest that, 
in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision should be 
interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply( ... ). In 
the present case, as has been pointed out in paragraph 28 above, Article 50 of 
the TRIPS Agreement applies to Community trade marks as well as to national 
trade marks. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule on the question 
submitted by the national court."124 
123 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trademark, OJ. 1994, L 11/1. 
124 Paras. 30 to 33 of the judgement. 
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Here, the Court argues from a practical point of view when it refers to the 
Community's clear interest to avoid different interpretations. As shall be 
seen forthwith, there are also legal arguments to come to the Court's 
conclusion. 125 The Court states that a provision of the WTO Agreement, 
regardless of whether its comes within the Community's competence or 
not, can be interpreted by the Court if that provision can apply to situations 
falling within the scope of both Community and national law. Thus, there 
is no strict equivalence between the Community's power to conclude an 
international agreement and the Court's jurisdiction to interpret them. 
The Court, however, did not deal with the question of whether its 
jurisdiction extends to the interpretation of all provisions of international 
agreements, even if they might not apply to situations falling under the 
scope of Community law. Is it also in the Community's interest, although 
not as "clear" as in the other situation, to have a uniform interpretation of 
those provisions? 
IV. Discussion 
It must be noted that in Hermes, the prov1s1on under question was 
concerned with an issue in which the Community had not exercized its 
internal competence. Thus, the subject generally fell within the Member 
States' competence. However, it cannot be said that the Community is not 
a contracting party to the WTO Agreement with regard to those provisions. 
Although Articles 1 and 2 of Decision 94/800 approve of the Agreements 
"on behalf of the European Community with regard to that portion of them 
which falls within the competence of the European Community", both the 
Community and its Member States have signed the WTO Agreement as a 
whole, a "single package", and without any reservation towards the other 
Members. They are thus full Members of the WTO and in like manner 
responsible for any breach of the Agreement. Obviously, the division of 
competencies is of internal significance only. 126 In Hermes, some Member 
States and the Council have argued that only those parts of the WTO 
Agreements were part of Community law that fell within the Community's 
125 See below at IV. 
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competence and that accordingly the European Court of Justice was 
competent for the interpretation of those only. 127 The Commission, 
however, was of a different opinion; it held that there was no total 
correlation between the competence to conclude an agreement on the one 
hand and the jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the agreement on the 
other hand. Its arguments were to a large extent of a practical nature. First, 
the Community's competence to conclude an agreement was derived from 
its effective and actual authority, whereas its jurisdiction to interpret 
provisions could also evolve from "potential" powers. Secondly, since 
mixed agreements were uniform agreements to which both the Community 
and its Member States were contracting parties, their interpretation and 
application had to be uniform as well. Thirdly, the WTO Agreements as a 
single package presented a uniform whole which demanded an 
interpretation directed by the same criteria; this was necessary to avoid the 
risk of dissenting interpretations through the European Court and national 
courts in important questions like the one of direct effect. 128 
As Advocate General Tesauro points out in his Conclusions, it could 
certainly be argued that, if there were sections falling within the Member 
States' exclusive competence, there would not be any need for total 
harmonisation of interpretation of those provisions of a mixed agreement. 
It would be very troublesome if the Court had the last word concerning the 
interpretation of the mixed agreement as a whole, especially with regard to 
the Member States' unlimited liability. 
However, the situation with most mixed agreements is different; areas with 
separated competence are not "reserved areas" of the Member States and 
do not stand beyond Community law. Usually, it will not be very easy or 
even possible to determine whether a provision is of importance either in 
Community or in national law only. Very likely some of the provisions 
might be connected. 129 Thus, the situation described above and the 
126 See case C-53196, Conclusions of attorney General Tesauro, Nov. 13th 1997, at paras 12 and 14. 
127 Ibid. at para. 16. 
128 Ibid 
129 See case C-53196, Conclusions of attorney General Tesauro, Nov. 13th I 997, at paras 19 and 20. 
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situation envisaged by the Court in Hermes is often construction rather 
than reality. A few examples may assist to depict that allegation. 130 
National treatment of imported products is provided for in Article III of the 
GATT whereas Article XVII of the GATS is a parallel provision 
concerning services. The effect of GATT Article III, falling within the 
Community's competence, would thus be determined by Community law 
while on the contrary the effect of GATS Article XVII had to be 
determined by the domestic laws of the Member States in so far as there is 
national law competence. Notwithstanding, both Articles in their 
application may concern rules and practices of the Member States much 
more than those of the Community131 , which makes it hard to understand 
why one of them should be determined by Community law. Apparently, 
the competence criterion is not rigorously linked with the type of rules the 
agreement practically affects. 
Furthermore, the following or a similar situation might show the 
difficulties and arbitrariness of a mixed approach to the domestic status of 
the WTO Agreement. If the Community and the Member States had 
committed themselves, for example, to the duty not to put any obstacles in 
the way of non-Community lawyers providing legal advice to EC citizens 
in the field of GATS and if that commitment applied to all modes outlined 
in Article I (2) of GATS, 132 the first mode came within the Community's 
exclusive competence133 whereas the others fell, ex hypothesi, under 
national competence. In a mixed approach, the domestic legal status of 
those commitments would then have to depend on the mode of supply. 
It also comes to question which legal order should determine the effect of 
the general provisions of GATS, such as most-favoured nation treatment, 
monopolies and transparency. Should they be determined by Community 
or national law? 
130 The following examples are indicated in Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO 
A?reement: lnterco11necti11g Legal Systems, 34 CMLR 1997, 11, pp. 20-22. 
13 See e.g. case C-469/93 Amministrazione de/le Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR 
I-4533, with regard to the Italian consumer tax on fresh bananas .. 
ITI . 
cross border, commercial presence, movement of consumer, movement of personnel. 
133 See Opinion 1/94, supra at paras. 36 to 53. · 
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Those examples have shown that a mixed approach to the WTO 
Agreement's domestic legal status is "undesirable, artificial and perhaps 
unworkable". 134 Although the arguments seem to be more of a practical 
nature there are also legal grounds to uphold the finding that one domestic 
legal status has to be favoured to sixteen in the case of the WTO 
Agreement. The legal orders of the Community are intertwined and 
integrated systems. The different parts of the WTO Agreement are 
inextricably linked. 135 In Opinion 1/94, the Court articulated the duty of 
co-operation between the Community and its Member States. 136 It can also 
be said that, similarly, national and Community competences are 
inextricably linked with the consequence that the Community's legal 
system could not tolerate a divergent, non-agreeing approach to the 
domestic legal status of the WTO Agreement. 137 Bearing the duty of co-
operation between the Community and its Member States in mind, it 
appears difficult to maintain discrepancies in the WTO Agreement's 
interpretation and application. 
First of all, legal certainty demands a uniform approach. Otherwise 
economic operators would encounter a number of difficult problems 
regarding the division of competence between Community and Member 
States on the one hand and the possible effects and interpretations of the 
WTO Agreement in the various national legal systems on the other. 138 
Secondly, it could be derived from Article 5 EC Treaty that Member States 
must be prevented from permitting diverging interpretations of national 
courts as these could have negative effects on the legal position of the 
Community regarding third states being Parties to the mixed agreement. 139 
134 1b.is is the fonnulation Eeckhout chooses in The Domestic Legal Status of the WIO Agreement: 
Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 CMLR 11, 20 (1997) with which the author agrees. 
135 Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, paras. 106-110. 
136 Ibid., at para 109. 
137 Castillo de la Torre, The Status ofGATT in EC Law, Revisited, 29 Journal of World Trade 1995, 
53, 67f.; M. Karrie!, The Exclusive Treaty-Making Power of the European Community up to the 
Period of the Single European Act (Kluwer, 1996), pp. 156f. 
138 Eeckhout, ll1e Domestic Legal Status of the WIO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR. 11, 23 (1997). 
139 Hilf, The Application of GAIT Within the Member States of the European Community. with 
Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Gemzany, in Hilf, Jacobs and Petersmann, The 
European Community and GATT, Kluwer 1989. p. 166. 
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Besides, a non-Member State to the Community being a Member to the 
WTO Agreement could hold the Community liable for the breach of an 
obligation caused by one of the Member States. The facts that the 
Community is a Party to the WTO Agreement and that an agreement 
concluded by the Community under Article 228 of the EC Treaty is 
binding on both the Community and its Member States can only lead to the 
conclusion that the Community is responsible for any part of the 
Agreement. Thus, the failure on the part of one of the Member States to 
fulfil its obligations under the WTO Agreement can hazardously concern 
the Community when the Community's and its Member States' obligations 
are part of an undivided whole, or when there are two distinct, but linked, 
groups of obligations. 140 It appears to be a legitimate interest on the part of 
the Community not to be held liable for the failure of a Member State and 
to claim its authority for a preliminary ruling to preserve a uniform 
interpretation and application of the particular provisions. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the Community and its Member 
States are under a duty to co-operate during the conclusion of the 
agreements as well as in their search for a mutual position in terms of the 
provisions' interpretation and application. 141 Every result that had been 
achieved on account of the duty to co-operate in bargaining and 
concluding an agreement would become a farce if there were no duty to 
co-operate in interpreting and applying the agreement. 142 
To the author's mind, the Court will even have jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings upon provisions of the GATT that do not yet seem to 
affect Community situations since Community competence evolves with 
Community law and will thus change continuously. Although the norms of 
the Community's legal system are of a different origin - international, 
Community and national law - the system is required to function and 
operate homogeneously on the outside. 143 
140 
Gaja, The European Community's Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agreements, in O'Keeffe 
and Schermers, Mixed Agreements, Kluwer, Deventer, 1983, p. 133, at 139f. concerning mixed 
agreements in general; see also Castillo de la Torre, The Status of GATT in EC Law, Revisited, 29 
Journal of World Trade 1995, 53, 67f. regarding the WTO Agreement. 
141 see also Conclusions of Attorney General Tesauro, at para 21. 
142 




Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of any provision of the WTO Agreement. 144 
Part 3: The WTO System in Comparison with GATT 
1947 and Other International Agreements 
A. The WTO-System in Comparison with GATT 1947: 
Similarities and Differences 
In order to decide on the question of the WTO Agreement's effect on 
Community law one needs to take a closer look at the features of WTO. If 
WTO' s effect differs to that of GATT 1947, the starting point must be an 
investigation of their conceptional differences. 
I. Type of Agreement and Parties to It 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 had been the only 
achievement after the failure of the whole Havana Charter, which had 
intended to establish an "International Trade Organization". GATT 1947 
was an agreement only relating to trade in goods. Moreover, the 
Agreement was regarded as being provisionally applied and was not even 
ratified by many of its Parties. GATT 1947 was basically a provisional 
treaty serviced by an ad hoc secretariat; although it maintained a 
"headquarter" in Geneva, GATT was not a formal organization. Rather, it 
was a format for discussions between members. 145 
In contrast, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization constitutes a full-fledged international organization, 
headquartered in Geneva. The WTO is not an amendment to previous 
agreements but an entirely new agreement administering the many 
agreements contained in the Uruguay Round Agreement (the WTO 
Agreement with its important four Annexes, Ministerial Decisions and 
144 Attorney General Tesauro comes to the same conclusion with regard to provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra, at para. 22. 
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Declarations and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial 
Services) through various councils and committees and its main organ, the 
Ministerial Conference. It also supervizes the implementation of tariff cuts 
and the reduction of non-tariff measures agreed to in the negotiations. The 
trade regimes of individual Members are constantly examined; Members 
can indicate proposed or draft measures by others that can provoke trade 
conflicts. Moreover, Members are asked to update several trade measures 
and statistics, which are collected by the WTO in a large statistical 
reference work. 
The new set of dispute settlement procedures is also designed to promote 
an effective implementation of the substantive regulations established in 
the agreements. 146 
As a consequence of the organisational structure of the new WTO, parties 
to the agreements are no longer called "Contracting Parties", as was the 
case in G ATT 194 7, but "Members". It is noteworthy that the parties are 
not specified as "Member States"; this is due to the fact that other entities 
can become parties to the Agreement, as for example the European 
Community or Hong Kong did in 1994. 
II. Areas Included in the Agreement 
GAIT 1947 only subjected trade in goods to international rules. A 
troublesome sector was textiles and clothing, though falling within trade in 
goods. A number of "side agreements" establishing a special regime of 
quotas for trade in textiles and clothing caused non-compliance with 
GAIT in those products since 1961. 147 Moreover, GATT discipline was 
evaded in agriculture, since the U.S. government sought and obtained a 
GAIT waiver for the legislation of certain import restrictions on several 
agricultural goods. 148 This caused other governments to engage in 
similarly protective practices despite the lack of legal cover of a waiver, 
claiming equal treatment with the United States. 
145 Jackson, however, speaks of a "de facto organization"; See Jackson, The World Trading System 
f,- 59. 
46 See for the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) below at V. 
147 Jackson, The World Trading System p. 58. 
148 See Jackson, ibid., with footnote 97. 
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Likewise, GATT 194 7 did not contain detailed rules on the question of 
subsidising, except for the admission of countervailing duties as a response 
to them. Although negotiations in the Tokyo Round resulted in the 1979 
GATT Subsidies Code the language used in this code was considerably 
ambiguous and "tortured". 149 For instance, it did expressly not "intend to 
restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve [ ... ] policy 
objectives which they consider desirable", while those objectives were 
"the promotion of social and economic policy" and others. Similarly, the 
term "subsidy" was not defined and the signatories' obligation was merely 
"to seek to avoid [ .. ] serious prejudice to the interests [ ... ] through the use 
of subsidies". 
Furthermore, the Tokyo Round in 1979 failed to achieve an agreement on 
safeguard and escape-clause measures that would have been necessary to 
avoid uncontrolled usage of government actions reacting upon imports 
believed to "harm" the importing country's economy or domestic 
competing industries, especially the usage of "voluntary export restraints 
(VER)". 150 On the other hand, it must be said that the Tokyo Round (1973-
1979) was a first attempt to reform the system, 151 but it still suffered from 
the lack of being compulsory to each of the Contracting Parties. 
The WTO Agreement, in contrast, deals with trade in goods (GATT 1994) 
and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) in its Annex IA, trade in 
services (Annex 1B, "GATS") and with trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (Annex IC, "TRIPS"). Annex 2 to the WTO 
Agreement contains the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 3 a Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism and Annex 4 Plurilateral Trade Agreements, concerning trade 
in aircraft, government procurement, dairy products and bovine meat. The 
Plurilateral Agreements, however, do not fall under the compulsory part of 
the Uruguay Agreements. Members are free to sign them or not. 
149 Ibid.. p. 289. 
150 see below under IV. 
151 See the Tokyo "codes" on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures -interpreting Articles 6, 16 
and 23 of GATT, on Technical Barriers to Trade - sometimes called the Standards Code, on Import 
Licensing Procedures, Government Procurement, Customs Valuation - interpreting Article 7, on 
Anti-Dumping - interpreting Article 6, replacing the Kennedy Round code, the Bovine Meat 
Arrangement, the International Dairy Arrangement, and the Trade in Civil Aircraft. 
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Annex 1 includes an Agreement on Agriculture as well as an Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing, both of which, however, will need further 
attention ahead, as their results are relatively meagre, compared to initial 
eagerness. 152 In addition, an Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures has been concluded and inserted into Annex 1, which 
substantially improves the Tokyo Round Code, but still contains several 
"exception clauses" that could lead to misuse. Another major achievement 
of the WTO Agreement is the Agreement on Safeguards in its Annex 1. 153 
Ill. Interconnection between the Agreements 
Another significant characteristic of the Uruguay Agreements is the 
"single-package" idea. The Tokyo Round resulted in the inclusion of many 
specific side agreements the ratification of which was non-compulsory 
("GATT a la carte"). The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle of 
GATT was and is still unconditional. 154 Under GATT 1947 however, this 
meant that "foot-draggers" and "free-riders" were given unreciprocated 
advantages because all benefits of new specific individual agreements had 
.. to be granted to non-agreeing parties who in return could not be forced to 
grant any of those benefits by themselves. Although the unconditional 
MFN clause ultimately pursues the enhancement of free trade, it cannot be 
. denied that the disadvantage of "foot-draggers" was an incentive for 
nations to stay out of new agreements. Moreover, the number of up to 200 
Agreements was confusing and badly arranged since it was everything else 
but clear as to what country was party to which agreement. 
This inconvenience has been done away with in the new WTO where 
every Member must agree to all parts of the Uruguay Round results, 
except for the Plurilateral Trade Agreements under Annex 4. In other 
words, all those who want to become Members of the WTO must adhere 
and accept the entire elaborate text. Thus, foot-draggers who take 
advantage without making concessions in return are done away with. 
152 Jackson, The World Trading System pp. 2f. 
153 See below under IV. 
154 See Article I of GA TT. 
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IV. Discipline of the Parties and Credibility of the Rules 
The lack of discipline of the GATT 194 7 Contracting Parties has already 
been demonstrated above regarding the sector of agriculture, where certain 
countries evaded GATT rules without being authorized through a 
waiver. 155 Especially the use of quotas156 in the area of agricultural 
products did not cease, even after the establishment of external currency 
convertibility in the main western European trading countries in 1958. 157. 
The Tokyo Round Agreement on Import and Licensing Procedure contains 
provisions that impose adequate procedures in cases where quotas are 
used; it is now part of the Uruguay Round compulsory text. 
Other areas tolerating elusion under GATT 1947 were the already 
mentioned safeguard measures. The leading provision in this regard was 
GATT Article XIX, the "escape-clause", which permitted temporary 
border barriers to imports when imports were increasing and could be 
shown to "injure" domestic competing industry. However, the term 
"injure" was very broad and it was not clear what exactly was understood 
as "domestic competing industry". As a consequence, safeguard measures 
under Article XIX could be justified very easily. Moreover, Article XXV 
GATT provides the possibility to vote waivers. Those measures are 
labelled as safeguards 158 since they can regularly be used as legal defence 
for numerous border-import restraints that are inspired by safeguard 
policies. 
Another type of safeguard action is the technique of export restraints that 
an exporting country imposes on behalf of or at the request of an importing 
country in the form of "voluntary export restraints" (VER), "orderly 
marketing agreement" (OMA), "export restraint agreement" (ERA) or 
"voluntary restraint agreement" (VRA). Those agreements are highly 
problematic since they are regularly kept secret and are thus intransparent. 
155 See above under IT. 
156 TI1e use of quotas is prohibited by Article XI GAIT; the purpose of avoiding quotas is to prevent. 
abusing, conuption of administrative sectors, delay and expense in the government procedure; see 
Jackson, The World Trading Svstem p. 153. · 
157 The balance-of payment (BOP) exception had been a regularly used excuse to use quotas instead 
of tariffs. The currency convertibility made the excuse of the BOP exception unworthy of belief in 
most of the cases and was quite successful. 
158 See Jackson, The World Trading System p. 180. 
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Hence, neither international nor domestic proceedings can supervise or 
control them. 159 
In GAIT 1947, safeguard measures were a troublesome topic smce a 
safeguard code designed to set limits and definitions to the technique of 
safeguards did not exist. 160 Similarly, procedures and requirements for the 
adoption of waivers were not determined which lead to a rather wide and 
uncontrolled usage of waivers. 
The inclusion of an Agreement on Safeguards in the Uruguay Round 
Agreement is therefore a major achievement. It includes procedural rules, 
definitions of ambiguous terms such as "serious injury", "threat of serious 
injury" and "domestic industry", sets limits to the duration of safeguard 
measures, 161 eases the compensation prerequisites under the former GAIT 
rules and severely prohibits the use of safeguard actions or VERs other 
than expressly permitted. 162 The WTO Charter also considerably stiffens 
the rules regarding waivers in empowering the organization to terminate 
waivers 163 and in its Understanding on the Interpretation of Art.XXV. It 
can be said that the WTO Agreement completes the evolution of GATT 
194 7 and especially the changes initiated in its latest years after the Tokyo 
Round. 
V. Dispute Settlement 
Another major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round is the provision of a 
legal text - as opposed to just customary practice - for the procedures of an 
overall unified dispute-settlement system applicable to all parts of the 
Uruguay Agreements. Due to the major changes in this regard and the 
importance for the question of direct effect of WTO rules, the changes will 
be described more thoroughly. 
The most important improvements of the dispute settlement system can be 
summarized as improvements to the constitution of panels, in the timing of 
159 See more detailed Jackson, ibid., pp. 203f. 
160 It has already been mentioned above under II. that the objective of the Tokyo Round 
negotiations to develop a new safeguard code failed. 
161 Normally eight years. 
162 See Section VI of the Agreement Safeguards. 
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dispute settlement procedures, in the consistency of application of rules by 
the establishment of appellate review and improvements to procedures 
concerning non-compliance with decisions. 164 
1. The Provisions for Dispute Resolution 
Under GATT 1947, there were only a few Articles dedicated to the subject 
of dispute settlement procedure due to the fact that the GATT was not 
intended to be an organization. The basic and formal procedures were 
described in Articles XXII and XXIII. 165 
In contrast, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and its appendixes contain thirty~five pages 
with detailed rules concerning the procedures of the settlement of disputes 
in the areas of goods, services and intellectual property. 
2. The Composition of Panels 
In early years of GATT, it was up to the semi-annual meeting of the 
Contracting Parties to sort out disputes. 166 Soon an "international 
committee" was set up that consisted of representatives of the Contracting 
Parties. Later, a working party composed of nations was formed to settle 
disputes under GATT. Then, in the 1950s, the Contracting Parties agreed 
to shift from the use of a working party composed of nations to referring 
disputes to a panel of experts. It was decided that members of that panel 
should not depend on their governments' instructions but should function 
in their own capacity167 In this regard, the development displayed a shift 
from a basically power-oriented and negotiating system to a more rule-
oriented, arbitrational one. 168 
Nowadays, the DSB is responsible for-the establishment of the panel of 
experts at its first meeting after the request. Whereas previously panels 
were composed of trade officials from GATT delegations panellists may 
163 See Article IX (3) GAIT. 
164 See Bartos, Enforcing the "Rules" of International Trade Law, 
http:/ /www.progsoc.uts.edu.au/-alsa-ito/journaVbartos.htm 
165 Articles XXII and XXIII of GAIT 1947, amended through the Tokyo Round 28 Nov. 1979. 
166 Jackson., The World Trading Svstem p. 115. 
167 . ' 
lbtd., pp. I 15-116. 
168 Ibid., pp. 114 and 116. 
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now be drawn from a wider range of people; non-governmental individuals 
can be included. They are impartial and not subject to any instructions. 
The shift to legalism has thus been furthered through the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations. 
3. The Procedure 
The improvement to the dispute settlement's procedure is another major 
achievement of the Uruguay Round. The GAIT 1947 dispute settlement 
was largely characterized by informality and pragmatism. In agreement 
with the Court's opinion, they could not seriously be regarded as fulfilling 
the Van Gend &Loos' "clear and unconditional test" .169 Although the ITO 
had been intended to provide stronger sources of regulatory authority, this 
was not the case in GAIT, which was regarded to be provisional. 170 The 
Contracting Parties' lax practice rather diffused the whole procedure, 
which can, for example, be seen in the legal status of the European 
Community under GAIT. A kind of "wait-and-see" approach was 
developed which invented a pattern leading to other forms of laxity in 
areas outside the EC-GAIT-legality issue, 171 e.g. the areas of agriculture 
and international development agreements. 172 
173 a. Procedure under GA TT 194 7 
The process of dispute resolution started with a legal claim being 
submitted to a panel of three to five independent persons selected by the 
GAIT Secretariat with the parties' approval. 174 The defending party was 
able to delay the process and especially the panel's creation. 175 Subsequent 
to the panel's hearing of oral and written legal arguments submitted by the 
169 Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council, at para 110. 
170 Hudec, Robert E., The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy p. 58 (2d edition 1990). 
171 Chen, Going Bananas, 63 Fordham Law Review 1995, 1283, 1322. 
172 Hudec, Robert E., The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy p.· 212 (2d edition 
1990). 
173 Referring to Articles XXlI and XXIII of the General Agreement. 
174 Hudec, Robert E., Enforcing lntemational Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modem GATT 
Legal System, 9 ( 199 3 ). 
175 Ibid., at 54; nowadays, the DSB can reject the establishment of a panel by negative consensus 
which is, practically, unachievable because at least the complaining party" would object; see 
Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Jun·sprudence, paper 
presented at "WTO, law and Development in South Africa", Conference held at the University of 
the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at Fn. 25. 
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parties and intervenors, the panel would consider the support of the GAIT 
Secretariat and produced a report containing a legal opinion to settle the 
dispute. However, the panel report was without legal force if not the 
Contracting Parties adopted it. 176 Since the report had to be adopted 
unanimously, the losing party was able to block the adoption of the panel 
report. 177 Thus, in many cases, the existence of a panel· report did not 
change anything. 178 Moreover, even if the panel report was adopted, its 
language was often wide and ambitious due to political motives; 179 
besides, government actions would originally not be questioned which is 
why the panel's abilities were limited to a large extent. 180 Panels regularly 
tried to invent a precedential body of "law" to be used in the future, for 
example in those cases where they decided on the merits of a case even if 
the dispute was controversial. 181 Another problem of dispute settlement 
under GAIT was that very often its rules were flexible and troublesome to 
interpret. 
It seems that the GATT dispute resolution procedure aimed not so much at 
the enforcement of GATT rules but rather at the promotion of dialogue and 
mutually satisfactory solutions. Many panel cases have never been 
adopted. The problem of the Community's association agreements' GATT 
compatibility, for instance, was never resolved; instead, the United States 
agreed to stop contesting those agreements against Community 
compromises on the Generalised System of Preferences. 182 
b. The New DSU: Consultations and Panel Report 
The Uruguay Agreement contains a Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU)183 which formulates rules that partly existed before but not with the 
176 Hudec, ibid., at 9. 
177 Ibid., at p. 20 I. 
178 Ibid., at p. 54. 
179 Ibid., at p. 12. 
180 Ibid., at p. 259. 
181 Ibid., at p. 262; Jackson, The World Trading System p. 114. 
182 Hudec, Robert E., Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modem GATT 
Legal System, at 39 (1993). 
183 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Members, reprinted in 
Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning tl1e Conclusion of tile Results of tile Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-94), COM (94) 143 final 353. 
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same status. 184 It is a compulsory part of the Agreement and its rules apply 
to any dispute occurring under the WTO, except for commercial policy 
d. 185 1sputes 
The whole procedure is characterized by continued negotiations between 
the WTO Members until a panel report is issued. 186 When a Member 
requests consultation, the defending Member must reply within 10 days 
after receiving the request and enter into negotiations within 30 days. 187 If 
the defending party fails to do so or if there is no settlement within 60 
days, a panel is established. 188 Thus, in contrast to the old GAIT dispute 
settlement, the new procedure can no longer be delayed or brought to a 
standstill through one party remaining silent. 189 
A third party can be involved in the consultations if it has a significant 
interest in the dispute. 190 After the establishment of a panel, arguments will 
be heard from the parties and also from third parties. 191 The panel then has 
to objectively estimate the dispute and draw factual, legal and other 
conclusions to assist the DSB in making the proper recommendation or 
appropriate ruling. 192 Afterwards, the panel issues an interim report, which 
the parties have one week's time to comment 9n. After one week, the 
interim report becomes final with either the content of the interim report or 
a summary of the dispute and the statement that a mutual agreement has 
been reached, depending on whether the parties have found a mutual 
agreement or not. 193 The final report has to be adopted by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) at least 20 days after its distribution to all 
Members 194 and must be adopted within 60 days, if not a party notifies the 
DSB of its intention to appeal. In the latter case, the final report will not be 
184 Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Jurisprudence, paper 
presented at "WTO, law and Development m South Africa", Conference held at the University of 
the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at p. 1. 
185 Ibid.. at p. 6. 
186 Article 3 (6) of the DSU. 
187 Article 4 (3) of the DSU. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution lvfechanisms and Jurisprudence, paper 
presented at "WTO, law and Development in South Africa", Conference held at the University of 
the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at p. 7. 
190 Article, 4 ( 11) of the DSU. 
191 Article 10 (2) of the DSU. 
192 Article 11 of the DSU. 
193 Article 15 (2) of the DSU. 
194 Article 16 (I) of the DSU. 
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adopted pending the appeal. 195 The DSB adopts the report under the 
process of the "negative consensus;;_ This means that, in contrast to the 
former possibility of blocking of panel reports, all Members have to agree 
otherwise to block the adoption of the report. If they do not do so, the 
report is adopted. The achievement of such "negative consensus" is very 
unlikely since at least the favoured party to the dispute will accept the 
report. 196 
c. The New Appellate Body 
Another significant change to the former dispute resolution is the already 
mentioned creation of an Appellate Body that is described as having all the 
characteristics of an international tribunal. 197 The Appellate Body 1s a 
permanent body with seven completely independent members and 
appointed for four years. 198 According to Article 17 (6) of the DSU, the 
Appellate Body only reviews legal aspects of the panel report. Finally, an 
Appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB unless it decides by 
consensus not to adopt it within 30 days after its distribution to the 
Members. 
d. New Procedures Concerning Non-Compliance with Decisions 
The old GAIT dispute settlement process suffered from a lack of definite 
mandatory requirements regarding compliance with panel rulings. Parties 
were required to "make suitable efforts with a view to finding an 
appropriate solution". 199 Those solutions often resulted in compromises 
tolerating GAIT violations by one side. A recent example for the 
Contracting Parties' ignorance towards the panel findings is the banana 
trade dispute. Although a panel report found that the EC's banana tariff 
195 Article 16 (4) of the DSU. 
196 See Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Jurisprudence, 
paper presented at "WTO, law and Development in South Africa", Conference held at the 
University of the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at p. 11. 
197 Chen, Going Bananas, 63 Fordham Law Review 1995, 1283, 1329. 
198 Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Jurisprudence, paper 
presented at "WTO, law and Development in South Africa", Conference held at the University of 
the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at p. 11. 
199 Bartos, E11forci11g the "Rules" of lntemational Trade Law, http://www.progsoc.uts.edu.au/-alsa-
ito/joumal/bartos.htm , at III.4. 
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regime violated Articles I, II and III of the General Agreement,200 the 
Community blocked the adoption of the report. Subsequently, the majority 
of the Latin banana exporters entered into the Framework Agreement 
which was a political solution at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 201 
Although the Contracting Parties could, by majority vote, be empowered 
to postpone concessions through the instruments of retorsion, retaliation, 
or "rebalancing" of benefits, they actually did so very seldom. 202 On the 
other hand, the United States sometimes took such steps without 
permission. 203 Another method was to put "moral pressure" on the 
defending Contracting Party. 204 
Under the DSU, there are three options to follow and remedy DSB rulings. 
The first option of complying with DSB ruling is to terminate or phase out 
of the challenged measure within a "reasonable period" of time. 205 The 
second one is for the state in breach to compensate the affected 
Complainant State206 and the third one the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations, subject to DSB approval. 207 
Several provisions of the DSU suggest that the first option, compliance 
with rulings, is the primary and preferred one and that the other ones are 
not to be seen as equivalent alternatives. Article 3 (7) regards the 
withdrawal of the measure concerned as "the first objective of the dispute 
settlement mechanism". A panel or the Appellate Body "shall recommend 
that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that 
agreement"208 and "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings 
of the DSB is essential". 209 The clearest formulation in that regard is to be 
200 See EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, GAIT Doc. DS 38/R (Jan. 18, 1994) 
(restricted) 52. 
201 Chen, Going Bananas, 63 Fordham Law Review 1995, 1283, 1325. 
202 See dairy products case between the Netherlands and the United States where the Netherlands 
were allowed to use restrictions against importation of U.S. grain for seven years.; Jackson, The 
World Trading System p. 116. 
203 Jackson, The World Trading System p. 116 with footnote 39. 
204 Long, Olivier, Law and its limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System 85 (1987). 
205 Articles 3 (7) and 22 (I) of the DSU. 
200 Articles 3 (7) and 22 (I) of the DSU. 
207 Article 22 (8) of the DSU. 
208 Article 19 ( l) of the DSU. 
209 Article 21 ( 1) of the DSU. 
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found in Article 22 (1) of the DSU: "Compensation and the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in the 
event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a 
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered 
agreements." Furthermore, Article 22 (8) DSU provides that "[t]he 
suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary [ ... ]. 
[T]he DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of 
adopted recommendations or rulings, [ ... ] [while] the recommendations to 
bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements have not 
been implemented." Jackson derives from Article 26 (1) (b) of the DSU, 
which provides for non-violation cases that there is no obligation to 
withdraw an offending measure, the reverse conclusion that in violation 
cases there is an obligation to perform.210 
Although the tertiary alternative of suspension of obligations reminds of 
the traditional system, it has undergone certain changes. Retaliation is 
required to appear in the same sector as that in which the violation 
happened. Only if this is not practicable, retaliation can take place with 
respect to other sectors of the same agreement. If even this measure fails, 
provisions of an entirely different agreement can be subject to retaliatory 
measures. The Member concerned with retaliation can object to the level 
of retaliation. 211 
e. Conclusions 
Compared to the former dispute settlement procedures, it can be said that 
the first stage of the DSU is guided by the purpose of conciliation, and 
thus is, in this regard, not very different to the former procedures. The 
DSU, however, provides for time limits and general clarification already in 
that stage. Economic power can no longer force poorer countries to force 
negotiations before a panel report is issued because there is no more 
210 Jackson, John H., The fVIO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 American Journal of International Law, 60, 63. 
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possibility to prolong and postpone the whole procedure. The Appellate 
stage, in contrast, is much more arbitration orientated and close to a 
judicial review. 212 Moreover, it has to be appreciated that the possibility of 
blocking by one of the parties is no longer possible due to the negative 
consensus approach. The provisions concerning the implementation of 
DSB findings show that compliance with WTO rules is the very first 
objective of the DSU. The language in the DSU does establish a preference 
for exact and prompt performance, although it still recognizes 
compensation as a possible remedy, which can easily be seen in the 
wording ofDSU Article 22. 213 Nations cannot as a principle bargain out of 
WTO obligations anymore. 
4. Annex: Access to the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Under the WTO, only Members are entitled to initiate the dispute 
settlement procedure. If citizens have a complaint against a foreign nation, 
they generally have to require their own governments to commence 
proceedings. The state, however, is not forced by international law to grant 
that plea. It is up to the nation's domestic law to endow the individual with 
recourse. 214 
Council Regulation No. 3286/94,215 which has replaced the Community's 
1984 "New Commercial Policy Instrument"216 provides for Community 
procedures to ensure that the Community's rights under international trade 
rules (and thus under the WTO) are efficiently exercised. The regulation 
maintains the possibility for Member States and for the Community 
industry to file a complaint to the European Commission, but additionally 
includes as its main innovation a third track for individual Community 
211 See Bartos, Enforcing the "Rules" of International Trade Law, 
http:/ /www.progsoc.uts.edu.au/-alsa-ito/journal/bartos.htm III. 4. 
212 Philippe, World Trade Organisation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Jurisprudence, paper 
presented at "WTO, law and Development in South Africa", Conference held at the University of 
the Western Cape on 11 and 12 November 1998 at p. 12.; Chen Going Bananas, 63 Fordham Law 
Review 1995, 1283, 1330. 
213 See above under d.; DSU Article 22 (2) declares that if a Member "fails to bring the measure 
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance [ ... ] within a reasonable period 
of time [ ... ] such member shall, if so requested, [ ... ] enter into negotiations with any party having 
invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable 
compensation." 
214 See Jackson, The World Trading System p. 128. 
215 Council Regulation No. 3286/94 of 31 December 1992 O.J. No. L 349. 
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enterprises to file on their own behalf a complaint to the Commission. Iii 
order to file such a complaint, the enterprise must have suffered an adverse 
trade effect in a third country market. It is not necessary for the 
Community undertaking to prove the "injury" required for complaints filed 
by a Community industry. Similarly, not only complaints against illicit 
measures, but also against "legal" but distorting commercial practices can 
be inaugurated, provided that they create either injury or adverse trade 
effects and that international rules foresee a right of action concerning such 
practices (e.g. the WTO Agreement). 217 
Thus, similar to the United States' section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 
European enterprises can now force the Commission to request the 
establishment of a WTO panel and thus to challenge foreign trade 
practices. The regulation does, however, by no means assist Individuals or 
Member States in challenging measures by a European Community's 
organ itself 
VI. Integration of Developing Countries 
Developing countries are more adequately integrated into the WTO system 
than under GA TT 194 7 due to all countries' duties to have tariff and 
service schedules and the constriction of several less developed country 
exceptions. However, the special status of developing countries is 
respected, e.g. in the DSU Article 12 (11). 
B. Conclusion 
The examinations above show that the new WTO system, compared to the 
old GATT 1947, is a step forward towards a more legalistic approach. 
Many amendments have been made with regard to insufficiencies of the 
old GATT. The DSU considerably enhanced and reinforced the GATT 
194 7 dispute settlement mechanism by presenting deadlines for all 
procedures, creating an · Appellate Body and reversing the former 
consensus approach. In fact, it is no longer as flexible as the dispute 
216 Regulation No. 2641/84 of ! 7 September ! 984 O.J. No. L 252. 
217 See more detailed Jackson, The World Trading System, pp. 129ff. 
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mechanism under GAIT 1947, since it now closely resembles an actual 
judicial system. 218 
The Agreement on Safeguards and on the Implementation of GAIT 
Art.XXV prove that the power-oriented negotiation model has been 
replaced by a rule-oriented model. 
It does thus no longer seem appropriate to deny direct effect on a basis of 
the old line of arguments. 
Part 4: Direct Effect of WTO-Provisions? 
Having found that the ECJ may give preliminary rulings on the question of 
direct effect of WTO rules it will be investigated what argumentation the 
Court could use and how its decision could tum out. 
In view of the number of differences between GATT 1947 and the new 
WTO the question of direct effect has to be reviewed. First, some 
arguments for a possible recognition of such direct effect shall be 
enumerated. Arguments against this concept will follow afterwards under 
section B. The arguments under A. and B. do not necessarily reflect the 
author's point of view but are to be regarded as a mere enumeration. A 
discussion on the question of direct effect will follow in section C. 
A. Arguments Pro Direct Effect of Certain WTO-Provisions 
Especially with regard to the strengthening of certain rules in the new 
WTO system a lot of arguments seem to suggest the allowance for direct 
effect of certain WTO provisions. 
I. Exclusion of Direct Effect by the Council 
In its decision concluding the WTO Agreement, the European Council 
stated on a proposal from the Commission that 
"by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 
including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in 
Community or Member State courts".219 
218 Kuilwijk, Kees Jan, The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma, 1996, at 342; 
Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, II, 34. 
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It has been argued that this statement could be regarded as binding on the 
Court. 220 The Court has noted in Kupferberg that 
"In conformity with the principles of public international law Community 
institutions which have power to negotiate and conclude an agreement with a 
non-member country are free to agree with that country what effect the 
provisions of the agreement are to have in the international legal order of the 
contracting parties. Only if that question has not been settled by the agreement 
does it fall for decision by the courts having jurisdiction in the matter, and in 
particular by the Court of Justice within the framework of its jurisdiction under 
the Treaty, in the same manner as any question of interpretation relating to the 
application of the agreement in the Community". 221 
Apart from the statement on the Community's schedule of Commitments 
in the framework of the GATS that 
"The rights and obligations arising from the GATS, including the schedule of 
commitments, shall have no self-executing effect and thus coiner no rights 
directly to individual natural persons or juridical persons", 222 
the WTO Agreement does not enclose explicit provisions on its effect in 
the domestic legal order of its Members. 223 Thus, according to the 
principle mentioned, it would be up to the Court to decide. However, it has 
been put forward that, since those Community institutions had the power 
to negotiate and conclude agreements as well as to determine their 
domestic legal effect, it might also be possible that the same institutions 
could decide that question in the act of conclusion. 224 In the United States, 
for example, the Congress controls the determination of the "self-
executing" character of international agreements. 
Be that as it may, the Court's finding in Kupferberg and the rules in the EC 
Treaty are clear. Provided that the WTO system can be regarded as a 
219 Council Decision of 22 Dec. 1994 concerning the conclusion on· behalf of the European 
Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994 ), O.J. 1994, L 336/1. 
220 See C. Tomuschat, in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, 4111 ed. 
(Nomos 1991 ), p. 5684. 
221 Case 181/73 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, (1974] ECR 449, at para 17. 
222 See legal instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Done at Marrakech on April 25111 1994, Vol. 28. p. 23557. 
223 Eeckhout points out that a Swiss proposal for an express reference in the agreement to direct 
effect was not accepted; see Eeckhout, Domestic Legal Status of the TVTO Agreement, 34 CMLRev. 
11, 39, at footnote 84 (1997); However, Switzerland is not a Party to the WTO. 
224 Eeckhout, Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement, 34 CMLRev. 11, 39 (1997) does not 
give an answer to this very question he poses. 
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system of enforceable rules, it is generally up to the national, respectively 
Community, transformer of those rules to allow for or reject direct 
effect. 225 For the Community, this is anticipated by primary Community 
law, i.e. by Art.228 VII of the Treaty, which provides that 
"Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article shall be 
binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States." 
Thus, this question is not left to the disposition of institutions responsible 
for the release of secondary European legislation. 226 From a legal point of 
view, an act of transformation is not necessary to implement WTO rules in 
the Community. 227 Some criticize that little of this monistic tendency 
would be left if the agreement could not create directly effective rights and 
obligations. 228 
Additionally, the Council's statement only appears in the explanatory 
notes of the Council's decision but not in its material part which reduces 
its legal importance.229 
At the end of the day, the question of whether or not the Council's 
statement is binding on the Court relates to the problem of drawing the 
border between executive and judicial competences in Community law. 
Thus, a binding effect of the Council's statement must at least be rejected 
where the recognition of direct effect appears to be a mm1mum 
constitutional demand, smce it is up to the Court to guarantee 
constitutional demands. 230 
Accordingly, the Council's statement in the decision mentioned above has 
to be regarded as a mere indication of the Council's political motive. 231 
225 See Stein, "Ba11a11e11-Split"?, Europaische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1998, 261, 263; see 
also Conclusion of Advocate General Tesauro in the Hemies case, at paras 24 and 25. 
226 See Stein, ibid., at 263. 
227 Schroeder, Die EG, das GAIT und die Vollzugslehre, Juristenzeitung 1998, 344, 345; Eeckhout, 
The Domestic Legal Status of the fvTO Agreeme11t: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 CMLRev. 
1997, 11,25. 
228 Eeckhout, 711e Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, 11, 29; however, it can be criticized that refusal of direct effect does not mean that the 
a§reement is not part of Community law. 
22 See Conclusion of Advocate General Tesauro in the Hemies case, at para. 24. 
230 Schmid, Christoph, Immer wieder Bananen: Der Status des GATT/fvTO-Systems im 
Gemei11schafisrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 190, 195; Weiss, Friedl, The General 
Afeeme11t 011 Trade i11Sen1ices1994, 32 CMLRev. 1177, I 188 at footnote 37 ( 1995). 
23 See Stein, "Ba11a11e11-Split "?, Europaische Zeitschrift for Wirtschafl:srecht 1998, 261, 263. 
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II. No Longer "Diplomatic Arrangement" 
According to the Court's reasoning to deny direct effect of the old GATT, 
it was too flexible to be directly applied. It was in large amounts a 
diplomatic arrangement between the Contracting Parties rather than a 
strictly binding agreement. There was always a way to re-negotiate or 
unilaterally suspend commitments. The dispute settlement mechanism was 
consensus-based and had thus "no real teeth". 232 
The Court's rulings on the old GATT should not unhesitatingly be 
transposed to the WTO Agreement as a whole. 233 The new agreements on 
services and intellectual property law are beyond the range of traditional 
GATT law. A new analysis of the WTO Agreement's "spirit, general 
scheme or terms" for the purpose of determining whether or not parts of it 
produce direct effect seems appropriate. 
1. TRIPS and GATS Agreement 
Especially the TRIPS agreement appears to be highly apt for direct effect. 
Artkle 3 of the Agreement states that "Members shall accord the treatment 
provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members[ ... ]". 
Intellectual property rights are essentially private rights, as recognized in 
the preamble. The TRIPS agreement dictates standards about the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights (Part II), and it 
contains provisions of enforcement of intellectual property rights (Part III). 
It does not appear as a diplomatic arrangement, and some authors find it 
difficult to find persuasive objections against it having direct effect.234 
The GATS, in contrast, is shaped similarly to the GATT, and makes use of 
the GATT's main rules and mechanisms, e.g. most-favoured nation 
treatment, national treatment, negotiated market opening. However, the 
Community and its Member States have excluded direct effect in their 
Schedule of Commitments under the GATS. 
232 Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems. 34 
CMLR 1997, 11, 30. 
233 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal offoternational Law and Business ( 1996-97), 556,604. 
234 Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, 11,33. 
48 
2. Dispute Settlement Understanding 
As regards the sophisticated Dispute Settlement Understanding, the 
Court's argument based on the great flexibility and the primacy of 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements of GATT 1947 cannot 
be upheld in the same intensity for the WTO Agreement. The DSU 
considerably enhanced the GAIT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism by 
presenting deadlines for all procedures, creating an Appellate Body and 
reversing the former positive consensus approach. 
The power-oriented negotiation model has been replaced by a rule-oriented 
adjucation model. 235 In contrast to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, the dispute resolution under the EC/Portugal Free Trade 
Agreement was far less detailed in its provisions; according to its Article 
32, the Joint Committee had to administrate and properly implement the 
agreement. It was entitled to make recommendations and take decisions. 
However, the Committee had to adopt its own rules of procedure and act 
by mutual agreement. 236 
Although there remains room for an out-of-court political settlement and 
the panel-system is not fully judicial, the improvements do eliminate a 
good deal of the flexibility of the old GAIT. As Eeckhout points out, "no 
rule of law is absolute in its application, and in many legal orders out-of-
court settlements are preferred to court proceedings. "237 
Since compensation and the suspension of concessions are sanctions 
provided for only if the DSB report is not implemented or implemented 
improperly, it has been put forward that those alternatives cannot be 
regarded as the normal termination of a dispute. Theoretically, every 
subject oflegal sanctions can chose as to which decision is more profitable 
to it and thus bargain out of its behaviour required by law. Although it has 
been said that the existence of a Dispute Settlement Understanding was in 
235 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1996-97), 556,604. 
236 Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 81. 
237 Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
C.MLR 1997, 11, 36; however, the possibility of a negotiated settlement is usually subject to a time 
limit whereas under the DSU, negotiations are possible until a 30-day waiting period after the 
adoption of an appellate report; see below under C.II. 
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itself an argument against direct applicability of WTO rules in its 
Members' courts,238 Petersmann argues that this line of reasoning was of 
the same value as the allegation, the mere existence of the European Court 
of Justice spoke against direct applicability of European law in national 
courts.239 
3. Safeguard Clauses 
One of the Court's arguments to deny direct effect of GATT 1947 was 
based on the flexibility of GATT 1947 Article XIX safeguard clauses that 
allowed for suspension of concessions in response to increased imports 
that "cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers". 240 It could 
already be argued with regard to GATT 194 7 that the Court's finding was 
incoherent with other decisions, where it was not upset by similar 
safeguard clauses when granting direct effect.241 In view of the new 
Agreement on Safeguards, this argument no longer appears to be a 
justification for denying direct effect inasmuch as now grey area trade 
restrictions are prohibited. Moreover, Article XIX of the GATT clarifies 
and reinforces the disciplines. Trade agreements regularly leave room for 
safeguard action, and many of those agreements were acknowledged to 
have direct effect. As the Court stated in Kupferberg, the existence of 
safeguard clauses "is not sufficient in itself to affect the direct 
applicability" of the agreement, as they applied only in specific 
circumstances. 242 GAIT safeguard clauses, including waivers (Art. XXV:5 
GATT), are only applicable under certain premises. Thus, without their 
application, the Court's finding in Kupferberg must also be valid for 
GATT/WTO law: The mere existence of safeguard clauses and dispute 
settlement reglementations does not necessarily preclude direct 
applicability of precise and unconditional provisions. The procedures 
under Articles 27 and 30-32 of the EC/Portugal Free Trade Agreement, 
238 See below at B. IV. And C. II. 
239 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, GATTIWFO-Recht: Duplik, in: Europaische Zeitschrift fur 
Wirtschaftsrecht I 997, 65 I, 653. 
240 E.g. lntemational Fmit Company, supra, at 1227. 
241 See Petersmarm, Ernst-Ulrich, Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement System: On the Use 
of Arbitration !11 GATT, in: The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Eds. 
Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmrum, Deventer, TI1e Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991, at 86-92. 
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however, were far less precise than those of the new WTO. As opposed to 
the WTO, no public investigation or publication of a detailed analysis was 
243 necessary. 
4. Reciprocity 
In Kupferberg, the Court also mentioned that 
"the fact that the courts of one of the parties consider that certain of the stipulations 
in the agreement are of direct application whereas the courts of the other party do 
not recognize such direct application is not in itself such as to constitute a lack of 
reciprocity in the implementation of the agreement."244 
Since the domestic legal effect of an agreement is governed by domestic 
rules, the practices of other jurisdictions could be suggestive with regard to 
the fitness of an agreement for direct application, but cannot replace the 
domestic rules and principles governing the internal effect of 
agreements. 245 Thus, the argument that other WTO Members do not grant 
direct effect to the agreement either does not appear to be a convincing 
argument. Petersmann argues that the principle of reciprocity was 
developed in a bilateral context and is impracticable in a multilateral treaty 
with over one hundred participants and that GATT law has always been 
based on u11co11ditio11af "most-favoured-nation" treatment. He further 
contends that to demand reciprocity would make no economic sense from 
a classical economic point of view, since trade restrictions by one country 
always results in larger costs than benefits for that country, no matter what 
the behaviour of any other contracting party. 246 
Ill. Non-Mercantilism 
The allowance for direct effect of WTO rules can also be supported by an 
objective to enhance global trade through minimization of mercantilist 
motivations. Indeed, even if other powerful nations like Japan, Canada and 
242 Case 104/81 Hauprzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, [ 1982) ECR 3641, at para. 21. 
243 Lee/Ke1U1edy, The Potential Direct Effect of GAIT 1994 in European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 80. 
244 Case 104/81 Hauprzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, [1982] ECR 3641, at para. 19. 
245 Eeckhoul The Domestic Legal Status of the WIO Agreeme11t: lnterconnecti11g Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, 11, 37; Brand, Direct Effect of lntemational Economic Law in the United States and 
the European U11io11, l 7 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1996-97), 556, 
601. 
51 
the United States do not grant direct effect to WTO rules, unilateral 
granting of such effect through the European Court would guarantee that at 
least the Community strictly adheres to its obligations under WTO. 247 The 
European Court of Justice might be seduced to try to allow the Community 
institutions maximum flexibility in performing foreign trade policy, which 
might, on the long run, harm not only other Member States but also the 
Community itself. 248 It has also been argued that the achievement of the 
WTO/GATT 1947 purposes, namely the reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers by means of non-discrimination and the enhancement of global 
trade, would be prevented by the denial of direct effect because the 
Community could not obtain the full economic welfare benefits possible 
under the agreement; furthermore, Individuals would be denied the 
protection of the "fundamental rights" provided by the agreement.249 
Furthermore, it has been said that there cannot be any Community interest 
that would be promoted through ignorance of WTO law. In contrast, the 
GATT panel report of I 994 on the Community banana measures 
emphasized that every aim pursued by those particular Community 
measures could be achieved in conformity with GATT, "including the 
objective of promoting the production and commerzialization of bananas 
from ACP countries". 250 
Certainly, direct effect can intensify multiple party adherence with the 
terms of a treaty by producing predictabilty in its application. If courts and 
decision-makers in one state know that the courts of another state grant 
direct effect to the provisions of a treaty, those courts and decision-makers 
will be much more comfortable in their own application of the same treaty 
provisions. 251 
246 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Application of GA.TT by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, C:MLRev. 392 (1983), 425. 
247 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in: National 
Constitutions and International Economic Law, Eds. Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Deventer, TI1e Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. 
248 Kuilwijk, Kees Jan, The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma, 1996, at 341. 
249 Ibid., at 257f.; Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law, in: National Constitutions and International Economic Law, Eds. Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Deventer, 11le Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993. 
~
50 GAIT-Doc. DS38/R Paragraph 168; see Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, GATTIWTO-Recht: Dtglik, 
m: Europa,sche Ze1tschnft for W1rtschaftsrecht 1997, 651,652. c.- · •· 
251 Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business ( 1996-97), 556, 607. 
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IV. International Constitutionalism 
One author has even argued that basic ethical, legal and peace-political 
principles of an international constitutionalism have to be taken into 
consideration. As Immanuel Kant had already explained in his exposition 
Zum politischen Frieden, those basic principles would require as a political 
and empirical fact that the individual citizen has to be recognized as a 
subject of rights of freedom and equality both in foreign and home affairs. 
Moreover, the rule of law, international law, home affairs and foreign 
affairs are inseparably linked.252 The denial of direct effect is suspected to 
result in "more treaties with no one having the need or incentive to abide 
by any of them" and "risks the creation of treaties having little or no real 
impact. "253 
V. Responsibility of the Member States 
A very interesting and evident argument for the acknowledgement of 
direct effect of certain WTO rules at least for Community Member States 
is the argument of judicial protection of those. Since each Member State is 
a party to the WTO Agreement itself, each one can be held liable for both 
its own and the European Community's non-compliance with WTO rules. 
This is to say that without the Member State's chance to invoke its 
obligations under the WTO in front of European Courts, it could be forced 
by the Community to violate an international agreement to which it is a 
signatory. The best example for this fear is the banana dispute, where 
Germany was not allowed to invoke certain GATT 1947 provisions to 
contest parts of the banana-market measures before the European Court of 
Justice, although its contravention with GATT had been confirmed by a 
GATT panel before. 254 In the case of the common banana market, for 
instance, every Member State could be held liable, regardless of whether 
they have voted for or against the banana measures. It would be quite 
252 This argument has been put forward by Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Daif die EG das Volkerrecht 
ignorieren?. in: Europaische Zeitschrift for Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 325; to the author's mind, it 
seems to be a bit farfetched to invoke paralegal philosophical arguments based on over 200 years 
old theories to resolve a concrete and only recent legal and international problem. 
253 Brand, Direct Effect of !11tematio11al Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1996-97), 556, 606. 
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unlikely that the Community itself would be held liable because the 
Community does not really perform trade, but rather administrates 
trade.255 Thus, market-participants of the Member States would be 
affected. Due to self-defence reasons, it is stated that Member States must 
have the right to question Community legislation that infringes the 
WT0_2s6 
VI. Protection of Individual Investors 
Moreover, it comes to question why citizens of the European Community 
who make investments and believe that European politics will be 
consistent with international law should not be judicially protected. This, 
for instance, happened to the complaining German importing company of 
bananas from third countries. After the Council's Regulation No. 404/93 
had come into effect, the enterprise was allowed to import no more than 
150 t bananas from third countries. That equals less than one hundredth of 
its average import amount over the past 6 years. 257 
Petersmann concludes that the acknowledgement of WTO guarantees 
within Community law would strengthen the latter one and the protection 
of basic European rights of Community citizens. 258 
VII. Individual Rights in GATT/WTO 
Petersmann has also put forward that certain guarantees of freedom and 
non-discrimination in GAIT have been recognized for almost 50 years, 
being "quasi-judicially" enforced as unconditional and actionable 
provisions through GAIT panels. 259 He argues that GATT/WTO rules lay 
down fundamental rights of freedom of trade, aimed at confining 
governments' power to tax their citizens and to intervene in their economic 
254 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Daif die EG das Volkerrecht ignorieren?, in Europiiische Zeitschrift 
fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 325, 326. 
255 Stein, Torsten, "Ba11ane11-Split"?, in: Europiiische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1998, 261, 
263. . 
256 Another suggestion of opponents of direct effect is for the Member State to leave the 
Community legislation unapplied by means of Art.5 EC Treaty. See below C. IV. 
257 See the case in front of the German Bu11desve,fassungsgericht in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1995, 950. 
258 Petersmmm, Ernst-Ulrich, GATTIWTO-Recht: Duplik, in: Europiiische Zeitschrift fur 
Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 651. 
259 Petersmmm, Ernst-Ulrich, Da,f die EG das Volkerrecht ig11orieren?, in: Europiiische Zeitschrift 
fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 325, 327. 
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freedom. Those rights would need to be of equal value as the fundamental 
right to free trade within the Community, acknowledged by the Court in 
ADBHU.260 Petersmann states that several GATT/WTO rules guaranteed 
legal and procedural rights to individual citizens such as Art.X GAIT, 
Art.VI GATS, Art.32, 41-50 TRIPS, Art.13 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement,261 Art.23 of the Subsidies Agreement262 and Art.XX of the 
Agreement on Government Procurement.263 If the Court left the question 
of GATT/WTO-compliance with the Council's or Commission's 
discretion ("political question doctrine"), this would set up an option to 
violate international la'-Y and was incompatible with the Treaty's Art.228-
234. 
VIII. Precision of GATT/WTO Rules 
It can also be said that several provisions of GATT/WTO, especially those 
dealing with non-tariff barriers, e.g. Art. III and XI GAIT, are much more 
precise than the comparable ones in the EC Treaty, e.g. Art.30, 34,264 36, 
43265 and 113. 266 According to Petersmann, the WTO guarantees of 
freedom and the DSU are much more effective than those of the UN 
Charter or the UN Convention on Human Rights. 267 The allegation 
GATT /WTO law was characterized by negotiations has been disputed due 
to the fact that only tariff bindings were subject to negotiations whereas 
the prohibition of non-tariff barriers had always been compulsory. 268 
26° Case 240/83, [1985] ECR 531, para 12 of the judgement. See e.g. Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, 
National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in: National Constitutions and 
International Economic Law, Eds. Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Deventer, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993, 3ff. 
261 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GA TT 1994 ( anti-dumping), Annex IA of 
the WTO Agreement. 
262 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex IA. 
263 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Darf die EG das Volkerrecht ignorieren?. in: Europaische Zeitschrift 
flir Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 325, 327. 
264 Art.29 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
265 Art.37 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
266 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Darf die EG das Volkerrecht ignon·eren?, in: Europaische Zeitschrift 
flir Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 325,327; Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WIO Agreement: 
Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 CMLR 1997, 11, 26. 
267 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, ibid., 331. 
268 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, GATTIWTO-Recht: Duplik, in: Europaische Zeitschrift flir 
Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 651,653. 
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B. Arguments Contra Direct Effect of Certain WTO-Provisions 
Despite the major changes and improvements of the new WTO 
Agreements, the validity of several arguments against direct effect of 
WTO Rules cannot be denied. 
I. Reciprocity 
One of the most striking arguments against direct effect of WTO-
provisions is the "reciprocity-argument". In view of the WTO 
Agreements' important and wide-ranging consequences for the national 
economy it is obvious that a Party that accepts the notion of direct effect is 
in a detrimental position compared to countries that do not grant such 
effect. It is thus often argued that there should be an equal domestic 
enforcement of the WTO in each Member Country. 269 
Since neither the United States nor Canada nor Japan as the most powerful 
nations besides the EC have granted "direct effect" to any of the WTO 
provisions, 270 it would, from a political and power-oriented point of view, 
be very unwise of European Courts to tie themselves to a certain 
interpretation of the Agreement and to warrant Individuals to invoke those 
rules. 
The comprehensive results of the Uruguay Round could only be attained 
through the single-package approach that ensured both concessions by-and 
benefits to all negotiating countries. From a political point of view, that 
careful balance would be overturned if only the Community as a major 
trading partner granted direct effect to WTO rules whereas the others have 
ruled out direct effect.271 
In systems where international rules achieve a higher status than municipal 
legislation - which can particularly be said for the European Union, where 
primacy is tied with direct effect - the granting of direct effect involves 
269 Kuijper, P.J., The New WIO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the Community, in J.H.J. 
Bourgeois, F. Berrod and E. Gippini Fournier (eds.), The Umguay Round Results - A European 
lawyers· Perspective, European Interuniverity Press, Brussels 1995, at 106. 
270 Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GAIT 1994 in European Community law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 89. 
271 See Sec. 102 (a) and (b) (2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, PL 103-465. 
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considerable danger. 272 Firstly, international treaties encompass a 
"democratic deficit" since they are generally negotiated by a few 
representatives and do not rise from the same democratic procedure as 
domestic legislation. Secondly, directly effective treaty rules limit the 
ability of national legal systems in reacting to the needs of their citizens 
because they force those systems to act and legislate only in coherence 
with those treaty rules. This must chiefly be said for rules of treaties that 
have been negotiated in a multilateral where amendments are difficult to 
achieve and thus rare. Thirdly, direct effect will hinder future treaty 
making smce governments fear constraints for their own national 
legislation. 273 
11. Practical Consequences 
There are several serious practical consequences that have to be considered 
if the Court granted direct effect to WTO rules. Granting direct effect to 
the GATT might lead to the invalidation of a great number of the EC's 
basic Common Market Organization regulations in the agricultural sector 
and would result in extensive confusion and insecurity throughout this 
sector. Moreover, it would be "prohibitively expensive" for the 
Community to pay foreign companies' damages whose imports into the 
Community have been affected by Community Regulations that violated 
the GATT.274 
Ill. Principle of Negotiation 
Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding strengthens former 
weaknesses in many ways, it appears to some authors that the WTO is still 
based on the principle of negotiation.275 As an example, the recent US.-
Japanese trade dispute over cars and car parts is mentioned, which was the 
first major dispute since the entry into force of the WT0. 27~ WTO Director 
272 Jackson, Jolm H., Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Ana(vsis, 86 American 
Journal of International Law (1992) 310,340. 
273 Jackson, John H., ibid., at 315f., 326, 330ff., 338. 
274 Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 88. 
275 Ibid., at 89. 
276 Detailed description of that case in WIO Spurs US. - Japan Agreement 011 Cars, WTO Focus, 
May-June 1995, at p. 1. 
57 
General Renato Ruggiero stated about this dispute that "the WTO dispute 
settlement system has done its job as a deterrent against conflict and a 
promoter of agreement", and "when required to do so, the system will 
provide a legal adjucation - more often, as in this case, it will serve as a 
catalyst for a resolution. That is exactly what it was designed to do ... "277 
Thus, the new dispute settlement system seems to draw a new line between 
legal adjucation and negotiation. According to this statement, the dispute 
resolution system seems to maintain its flexible nature instead of becoming 
a strictly legal mechanism and negotiation appears to remain the usual 
form of conflict resolution. 278 Although the preferable and primary 
solution of the DSU is the compliance of the losing party with WTO rules 
it· cannot be denied that a Member can chose to pay compensation 
whenever it wants to 279 
Additionally, the rights and duties under WTO are at the Members' 
disposal m the dispute settlement's compulsory first stage of 
consultation. 280 The possibility of obtaining a waiver is still available, and 
the Community has obtained a waiver with regard to the Lome Convention 
after the second "banana-panel". 
It can thus be argued that due to this "open" legal state of affairs the Court 
must become an "executor" of WTO-duties but leave this role to the 
. WTO-reglementation system itself. 281 
IV. Significance of the wro Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
It has also been doubted that the ensurance of direct effect to WTO rules 
would lead to a more efficient interconnection between Community and 
WTO law. According to the multifaceted character of the WTO's rules and 
mechanisms and the DSU, it is doubtful whether domestic courts should 
become everyday operators and interpreters of the WTO Agreements. It 
277 Ibid.. at p. 2. 
278 Lee/Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law, 30 
Journal of World Trade 1996, 67, 81. 
279 Sack, Von der Geschlossenheit und den Spannungsfeldern in einer Weltordnung des Rechts, 




would be undesirable that the Community's courts become the courts of 
the WTO. 282 
V. No Individual Rights in WTO 
Petersmann 's arguments concerning individual rights that are allegedly 
granted by the WTO have been dismissed stating that the WTO is far from 
guaranteeing individual rights of freedom and equality although, 
occasionally, the provisions are designed rather precisely. 283 The fact that 
new WTO rules require Members to guarantee certain means of legal 
protection is deemed a support not for the notion of direct effect but for 
exactly the opposite because obviously conversion of those rules is 
necessary. 284 
C. Discussion 
To this author's mind the weight that lays within both the arguments for 
and against direct effect of GATT/WTO rules calls for a compromise 
between both notions. However, unrestricted direct effect does not seem to 
be the perfect solution for the WTO system. 
I. Argument of Individual Rights 
It is dangerous to argue that direct effect is necessary to protect individual 
rights. Certainly, the Agreement on Government Procurement intends to 
create certain rights for third-country companies and several TRIPS 
provisions aim at the protection of intellectual property. However, one will 
end up in a viscous circle, i.e. assuming what one wants to prove, if direct 
effect is claimed to be necessary to protect those rights. The question is 
rather whether the WTO itself establishes mutual promises or whether it 
creates rights for Individuals similar to the EC Treaty. 285 It cannot be said 
that the WTO Agreement grants individual rights in the same intensity and 
for the same purpose as the EC Treaty does for the European internal 
282 Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WJO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 
CMLR 1997, 11, 50. 
283 Sack, Von der Geschlosse11heit und den Spannungsfeldem in einer Weltordnung des Rechts, 
Europaische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 650. 
284 Ibid. 
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market. The Community's right to non-discrimination, the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of undistorted competition are very 
different to parallel WTO principles. 286 The nature of the WTO Agreement 
is defined by rights and obligations between its Members, not between 
individuals. Furthermore, the signatories have never agreed to devote the 
agreements to individuals as they have certainly done, for example, in 
Human Rights Treaties. The Preamble to the WTO encompasses 
macroeconomic rather than microeconomic goals and thus envisages the 
WTO Members and not individuals as the entity to gain from those 
goals. 287 Besides, the DSU contains reglementations and procedures 
concerned with the settlement of disputes between Members, but not 
Individuals. The fact that direct effect is not acknowledged in the 
European Communities does not mean that the EC is not bound by the 
rules of the Agreements. 288 
As regards the TRIPS agreement, it surely ultimately aims at the protection 
of individuals' property rights. The language in TRIPS, however, implies 
that individuals are not provided with those rights by the agreement itself 
but that, again, Members are requested to grant those rights by means of 
their own law. For example, TRIPS Art.41 (1) states that "Members shall 
ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part ar:e available 
under their lcnv so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement. .. ". 289 In other words, the TRIPS Agreement is not itself 
regarded as the source to provide individuals with the appropriate rights, 
but conversion of the suggested aims into national law is deemed 
necessary. Similarly, TRIPS Art.42 (1) asks Members to "make available 
285 Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting, http://W\\-w.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3-.html, 4.1, at p. 1. 
286 Ibid., at p. 2. 
287 The wro preamble states that the Members recognize "that their relations in the field of trade 
and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standars of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and anhance the means for doing so in a manem consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, [ ... ].". 
288 Sack, Noch einma/: GATTIWTO und Europiiisches Rechtsschutzsystem, Europaische Zeitschrift 
fiir Wirtschafisrecht 1997, 688. 
289 Emphasis added. 
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to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of 
any intellectual property right covered by this Agreement. "290 The 
following Articles define what level of protection Member States shall 
grant, and Art. 51 agairi states that "Members shall [ ... ] adopt procedures to 
enable a right holder [ ... ] to lodge an application [ ... ]". In comparison, the 
European Convention of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right 
to life, [ ... ]",291 "[a]ll are equal before the law [ ... ]" ,292 and so forth. 
II. "Spirit" and "General Scheme" of WTO 
In the first place, it has to be discussed whether the new WTO system has 
introduced such changes that reasonably have to lead to a change in the 
Court's line of argumentation. In other words, the question arises as to 
whether the features of the old GATT that made the Court deny its direct 
effect, are still valid for the new WTO system. In this regard the above 
description of the new system shows that the WTO rules are not as flexible 
anymore and that the dispute settlement mechanism is at least as detailed 
as that in other international agreements that have been granted direct 
effect. It is close to a judicial system. Without any doubt, the new WTO 
system presents itself in a very different shape than the old GATT 1947 
did. The features important to the Court in International Fruit have been 
entirely reconstructed. The WTO is structure-cl as an international 
organization and the old system of exceptions, safeguards and waivers has 
been strengthened or reversed. Although waivers and exceptions are still 
available under the WTO, they are not the rule anymore; their prerequisites 
and procedures are strictly determined. The basic problem of the dispute 
settlement procedure, i.e. the possibility of "blocking" of a panel decision, 
has been altered. 
According to those findings, the "spirit" and "general scheme" of the 
whole WTO system seems to be different to those of GATT 1947. 
It is thus no longer appropriate to reject direct effect of the WTO on the 
ground that its rules are as flexible as they were under GATT 1947. 
290 Emphasis added. 
291 Article 3 of the Convention; emphasis added. 
292 Article 7 of the Convention; emphasis added. 
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Ill. Possibility of Consultations and Reciprocity 
However, the conclusion that unlimited direct effect has to be granted to 
several WTO rules does not follow necessarily. Since the flexibility-
criterion is not convincing anymore with regard to WTO, it comes to 
question as to whether other arguments speak against direct effect of WTO 
rules. 
Berkey has pointed out that "dispute settlement systems do not fall into one 
of two polar categories, i.e. hard legal or soft political systems, but rather 
lie along a continuum between the two".293 Although the new DSU has 
moved closer towards a more legalistic system, negotiation still plays an 
important role in the panel procedure. DSU Art.3 (3) shows that the 
adoption of a panel report is not the only way of resolving a dispute when 
it requires the "prompt settlement of situations in which a Member 
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the 
covered agreement are being impaired". Moreover, Art.4 of the DSU calls 
for consultations between the disputants before the establishment of a 
panel to hear the dispute. Art.5 adduces alternative mechanisms of solving 
a dispute, such as the use of good offices, conciliation, and mediation. 
Negotiations between the parties can take place parallelly to a panel 
procedure, because "where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop 
a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel shall submit its findings in the 
form of a written report to the DSB".294 The disputants can also attempt to 
settle their dispute by negotiated agreement in the 20-day waiting period 
provided for in Art.16 ( 1) of the DSU that has to be given before the report 
can be considered for adoption by the DSB. Even after the Appeals Body 
has adopted an appellate report, the parties can negotiate a settlement of 
their dispute until a 30-day waiting period has expired. Although the 
possibility of out-of-court settlements of disputes is not a new instrument 
and occurs regularly in law, the peculiarity of the DSU is that such 
settlement is even possible after the report's adoption by the Appeals 
Body. 
293 Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GAIT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3:.html, 2.3, at p. 5. 
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An example for the fact that the WTO DSU might sometimes promote, 
rather than reduce, the use of political negotiation to resolve disputes is the 
dispute over the U.S. Helms-Burton Act. 295 When no compromise was 
achieved between the US and the European Community on the Act which 
grants U.S. nationals a private right of action against foreign companies 
that "traffic" in US nationals' property confiscated by the Cuban 
government, a panel was formed which led the U.S. instantly to the 
statement that it would refuse any panel decision since it did not "believe 
anything the WTO says or does can force the U.S. to change its laws" 296 
The pressure for a political settlement of the dispute was intensified by the 
fact that a panel ruling would have either encouraged other Members to 
defend questionable trade-related policies under the GATT's national 
security exemption297 or weakened domestic political support in the U.S. 
for the WTO and thus slowed down trade liberalisation. 298 Eventually, the 
Community did suspend its WTO complaint for six months, however 
reserving its right to reinforce the complaint if no acceptable compromise 
was reached. 
Thus, one should rather call for a change in the attitude of the GATT 
Member governments before asking courts to grant direct effect of WTO 
rules. It must also be doubted that direct effect would be beneficial for the 
WTO system. The nature of the DSU may simply not require direct 
effect.299 
The intrinsic feature of the DSU, i.e. the possibility of settlement by 
negotiation throughout the whole procedure, would be evaded if courts 
granted direct effect to WTO rules. Direct effect would hinder the 
operation of the WTO because WTO Members would be tied to their 
national courts' decisions and could not make use of the choices provided 
294 See Article 12 (7) DSU ( emphasis added). 
295 See Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect/or the GAIT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3-.html, 2.3 at p.5. 
296 Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, New York Times, Feb. 21, 1997, 
Section A, at I. 
297 In the case of a ruling for the U.S. 
298 In the case of a ruling for the Conununity. 
299 Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GAIT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3-.html, 2.3, at p.6. 
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\ 
for in the Agreements. 300 The fact that the possibility to compensate for an 
infringement is afforded in the WTO suggests that this is what the parties 
wanted or could not agree upon to be strengthened. It would be wrong to 
conclude that now national courts have to do the rest for the strengthening 
of the WTO-system. 
For example, the Community would be denied the right to decide on the 
method of remedying a_n injury caused by one of its measures if the ECJ 
called for the removal of that measure due to the fact that it violates WTO 
provisions, even before a WTO panel has found that the measure actually 
does infringe the Agreement. Although the DSU certainly does not suggest 
the compensation alternative as a primary means of dispute settlement, tli.is 
possibili~y does in fact exist. Since every Member might in certain 
situations like to choose this alternative and since direct effect would deny 
the Community's power to offer compensation as a remedy for its WTO 
violations, direct effect does not seem desirable from that point of view 
either. 301 Again, it is up to the WTO's Members governments to change 
their attitude towards WTO rules before direct effect should be claimed to 
be the wisest solution. 
It can be helpful to regard the recent example of the Beef Hormones 
dispute under GAIT Both a GAIT panel and a WTO Appeals Body 
affirmed the Community's right to determine the appropriate level of 
consumer protection under the 1994 Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement although they had judged the Community's ban on the sale of 
hormone-treated beef to infringe the GAIT. The Community, in exchange, 
had to produce sufficient evidence for the ban. It has been suggested that it 
would have been more appropriate to allow the Community to pay 
compensation instead of trying to produce debatable scientific evidence by 
several Community officials and authors.302 Indeed, by choosing that 
300 ibid., at p. l. 
301 ibid., at p.2. . 
302 Reuters, France May Ban U.S. Meat Over Hormones, Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1997, part D, 
at 2; Berkey, The European Courl of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worlh 
Revisiting, http://www.Iaw.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonneUpapers/98/98-3--.html, 3.1, at p.3. 
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alternative, domestic political interests303 and requirements of the world 
trade system could be reconciled. As Berkey points out, it would seem 
entirely misappropriate and unfair to force the Community to do away 
with a complex domestic policy regime when compensation could easily 
be paid instead, especially if one considers cases similar to the Beef 
Hor~ones Case where not the U.S., but an individual small country were 
the only producer of hormone treated beer.3°4 In cases like this, direct 
effect would become seriously disturbing since the Court would have to 
order specific performance for a WTO violation. The Community could 
not choose the method of compensating breaches of the WTO and would 
thus be in a more detrimental position than if a WTO panel had held that a 
Community measure infringed the WTO. Furthermore, the Community 
could be obliged to annul a measure that in reality did not violate the WTO 
if the Court erroneously decided that a measure did infringe the WT0. 305 
Secondly, the reciprocity criterion is one of the most frequently mentioned 
arguments to reject direct effect. 
The Court's statement in Kupferberg regarding the reciprocity-argument 
must be read very carefully before alleging that a lack of reciprocity 
cannot by itself be sufficient to deny direct effect of international rules. On 
the contrary, the very reverse conclusion can be made. In Kupferberg, the 
Court stated that "the fact that the courts of one of the parties consider that 
certain of the stipulations in the agreement are of direct application 
whereas the courts of the other party do not recognize such direct 
application is not in itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the 
implementation of the agreement."306 Everything the Court says is that a 
lack of reciprocity in the acknowledgement of direct effect does not 
necessarily lead to a lack of reciprocity in the agreement's implementation. 
That means that, e contrario, the lack of reciprocity in the 
303 It has been disclosed by Community officials that the ban actually aimed at appeasing consumer 
scepticism about chemical additives in food; see Andrews, In Vict01y for US., Europe Ban on 
Treated Beef is Ruled Jllegal, New York Times, May 9, 1997, Section A, at 1. 
304 Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting. http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonneUpapers/98/98-3-.html, 3.1, at p.3. 
305 ibid., at p.3. 
306 Case I 04/81 Hauptzollamt Alainz v. Kupferberg, [ 1982] ECR 3641, at para ·19_ 
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acknowledgement of direct effect could be a decisive argument in rejecting 
direct effect if it does lead to the lack of reciprocity in the application of 
the agreement as a whole. 307 
The WTO Agreement is a unique international agreement that attempts to 
make the most of its environment's "Realpolitik" in offering remedies for 
violations that remain elastic enough for the maintenance of the 
agreement's functioning. To this author's mind, the WTO and particularly 
the DSU offer a choice of remedy in order to maintain thrust for the 
process of trade liberalisation as their essential objective.308 Berkeys 
supposition that "[p ]ermitting GATT members to preserve domestic 
legislation that arguably violates GATT provisions, as long as they are 
willing to pay for them in the form of compensation, may help convince 
those members to accept other restrictions upon their foreign trade policy 
autonomy"309 must be agreed with. 
Since neither Canada nor the United States nor Japan grant direct effect 
and would thus not be forced to annul their WTO-violating measures, the 
lack of reciprocity in the acknowledgement of direct effect would lead to 
the lack of reciprocity in the application of the agreement as a whole. In 
contrast, the Court was faced with an agreement between two parties of 
unequal strength in Kupferberg, i.e. Portugal and the Community. Here, 
the Community did obviously not have to fear the comparatively small· 
partner Portugal if it granted direct effect to the Agreement. The 
Agreement took the imbalance between both parties into consideration, 
which cannot be said for the WTO Agreement ( apart from those provisions 
concerning developing states). 
Thus, the Kupferberg statement that under certain circumstances the 
reciprocity argument is not sufficient to deny direct effect does not apply 
here. 
307 See also Tesauro at paras 32 and 33. 
,... 
308 Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GAIT: A Question Worth 
Revisiting, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3-.html, 3.1, at p.3. 
309 ibid., at p.3. . 
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IV. Conclusion 
Although most of the flexibility of the old GA.TT has been done away with 
direct effect in the sense that private individuals or Member States could 
invoke WTO rules in front of European Courts should not be granted 
without limitation. The Court's reasoning, however, should be built upon 
the reciprocity problem described above and not on a flexibility-
criterion. 310 
The danger that the Community could be deprived of its right to choose 
the compensation-alternative or to withdraw a measure which in fact does 
not violate the WTO does also exist if Member States can limitlessly 
invoke WTO provisions in front of the Court. This result seems odd since 
Member States are also Members to the WTO and the Community seems 
to be able to force a Member State to infringe the WTO. However, 
primacy should be granted to the WTO dispute settlement system. A last 
resort for a Member State to protect itself against sanctions of other WTO 
Members in case of a breach through the European Community would be 
its right to refuse the application of the Community's act by means of 
Art.5 EC Treaty. 311 
On the other hand, direct effect could be granted in those cases where 
WTO panel and Appeals Body rulings exist. 312 After a DSU panel has 
made a final ruling, the Community has had its choice to either adjust its 
law or choose the compensation alternative if permissible. 313 This "limited 
direct effect" would permit Individuals and Member States to put the 
Community's WTO obligations in force while precluding them from 
depriving the Community of its rights under the WT0. 314 
310 This has also been suggested as a possible solution to the Court in the Hermes Case by Advocate 
General Tesauro at para. 34; see also Schmid, lmmer wieder Bananen: Der Status des GAITIWTO-
S(istems im Gemeinschafisrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 190, 195. 
3 1 Now Art. IO of the Amsterdam Treaty; see Schmid, lmmer wieder Bananen: Der Status des 
GAITIWTO-Systems im Gemeinschafisrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 190, 196. 
312 Agreeing with Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting 
Legal Systems, 34 C:MLR 1997, 11, 51 and 58; Schmid, lmmer wieder Bananen: Der Status des 
GAITIWIO-Systems im Gemeinsclzafisrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 190, 196; 
Brand, Direct Effect of lntematio11al Economic Law in the United States and the European Union, 
17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business ( 1996-97), 556, 603; Beneyto, 298f. 
313 See also Berkey, The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GAIT: A Question 
Worth Revisiting, http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-3-.html, 3.2, at 
Pi· 5. 
14 Ibid., at p. 5. 
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Conclusions 
Part 2 illustrates that the European Court of Justice is entitled to rule upon 
the interpretation and mode of application of WTO rules within the 
European Union. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations have brought maJor changes to the 
world's trading system. As shown in Part 3, most of the former flexible 
rules of GATT have been reinforced. Nevertheless, the Dispute Settlement 
System provides for a conspicuously broad period of time in which the 
settlement of a dispute can be negotiated between the parties. It is evident 
that the acknowledgement of an unlimited direct effect concept needs to 
happen on a reciprocal basis amongst at least the most powerful Members 
to assure reciprocity in the WTO rules' application. Otherwise, the attempt 
to establish reciprocity through the WTO Agreement itself will be evaded. 
However, due to major achievements, e.g. on the safeguard sector, the 
Agreement concerning GATT Art.XXV and the stiffened rules under the 
DSU (negative consensus approach etc.), the Court should grant "limited 
direct effect" in cases where a final panel ruling exists. In those cases the 
Community will not be deprived of its reciprocal rights. 
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